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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 97 …Under it the naval air forces will be based on the fleet and move with it…
  • p. 260 …the ground, personnel of the Far East Air Force fought back as best they could in…
  • p. 267 …force of its ability to assert and maintain control of the air over its own bases…
  • p. 268 …were forced to break away because of a shortage of fuel. One pilot, Lt. William M…
  • p. 359 …By I June the Eleventh Air Force, so designated on 5 February, had been greatly increased…
  • p. 444 …bail out. Lts. William L. Turner and C.L. Reagan were forced into crash land- ings…
  • p. 464 …Available air base personnel were sent out to enlist the aid of local leaders and to…
  • p. 481 …Army Forces in Australia.’ General Brett assumed command of the Allied Air Forces on 2 0…
  • p. 764 …Fifth Air Force, 30 Sept. 1942; Statement of Personal Experience, made by Lt. Col. W.A…
  • p. 776 …A Study of the Origins of the Ninth Air Force, pp. 1-15; Stettinius, Lend-Lease…
  • p. 786 …1942; GO 4, 1 1 , 20, 26, 37, 38, and 5 2 , Fifth Air Force, 6…
  • p. 863 …position, 271-73, 277, 280; staging bases, 336 Western Air Lines, 358 Western Defense Comd., 190…
C H A P T E R 12
* * * * * * * * * * *
DRAWING THE BATTLE LINE
IN THE PACIFIC
HE SIX months which followed the attack upon Pearl Har-
bor were months in which the opposing lines of battle were
Tdrawn across the Pacific, but the drafting of these lines pre-
sented to the planners of Allied strategy a series of painful shocks.
One after another the great bases and focal points of Allied resistance
throughout the Southwest Pacific had been overrun by the full flood
of Japanese expansion, as the grand design of the enemy’s strategy
became increasingly clear. His prize was the fabulously rich Nether-
lands East Indies; by 10 March he held Java, and there remained only
the task of tidying up the loose ends through all the islands and the
final reduction of American forces in the Philippines. For the Japanese
planners, the problem now became one of organization of the gains.
Here, within their grasp, were rich stores of foodstuffs, minerals, and
the most vital resource of modern war, oil to fuel the fleet and power
the planes.
T o shield this vast empire, the Japanese navy felt the need for a
series of peripheral redoubts, minor and major bases which would
serve as sally ports, listening posts, and as effective deterrents to any
attempts on the part of the Allies to crash through into the vital com-
munication lines leading back to the home islands.’ Some of the islands
needed for the purpose already lay in Japanese hands, such as the
Marshalls and the Carolines, both of which groups had been obtained
so easily during the first World War; other bases, like Singapore,
Soerabaja, Amboina, and Rabaul were freshly acquired as the prod-
ucts of the relentless southern sweep of the enemy’s air, sea, and land
forces. Among the new bases were Guam and Wake, neither of them
so richly endowed as the Dutch or British prizes, but the capture of
’
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.