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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
small population and industrial capacity of Australia forced the Allies
into a heavy dependence upon seaborne supplies at the very time when
a shortage of shipping stood among the most acute problems confront-
ing the associated powers.
Air transport was as yet insufficiently developed to provide sub-
stantial relief. The Air Corps Ferrying Command assigned two
LB-3o’s to a South Pacific run in April, but the principal purpose was
the return of bomber ferry crews to the United Under
Harold Gatty, as director of Air Transport in Australia, progress was
being made in the organization of intra-theater transport services, but
as yet he lacked the planes, equipment, and trained personnel required.
In the development of inter-theater air transport, moreover, there
were administrative and jurisdictional problems yet to be solved. The
ferrying service across the Pacific, which increasingly came to be
joined with an air transport service, depended upon facilities a t Wil-
liamstown and Amberley which came under the control of the Di-
rectorate of Air Transport; and not until September would anything
like a satisfactory understanding be reached regarding the prerogatives
of a field command as against the autonomy considered essential to
the efficient operation of world-wide transport and ferry services.55
New forms of logistical support no less than new weapons of warfare
present their peculiar problems of command, and time is usually re-
quired to resolve them.
Considering the brief interval that had elapsed since the debacle in
the Netherlands East Indies, however, the emphasis must be placed
upon the progress made. During April and May, significant steps were
taken by the Australian government to adjust the economic capacities
of the country to the needs of the Allied military forces. In close co-
ordination with General MacArthur’s staff, the administrative ma-
chinery was provided to relieve congestion in the harbors, for a more
efficient direction of the production and distribution of food, and for
the supply of labor and equipment required in the construction of
military installations. Through these and other actions, Australia’s
productive capacity would substantially reduce the burden imposed
on Allied shipping.s6
At the same time, AAF units, as yet the only American forces avail-
able for combat duty, were moving forward to assist the Australians
in the defense of their continent, P-40’s of the 49th Group having
already taken position in defense of Darwin, the P-39’s of the 8th
.
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