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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
same time, civilian factory representatives of the several American
aircraft producers became well-nigh indispensable in the training of
service personnel, particularly by guiding them to an understanding
of the peculiar features of the several types of a i r ~ r a f t . ' ~
Work on a permanent supply and maintenance depot a t Tocumwal
in New South Wales, between Melbourne and Canberra, was in
progress by May. In selection of the site, the authorities had been in-
fluenced by previous RAAF plans for a similar use of the place, by
its convenient situation with reference to Melbourne and Sydney, and
by the fact that it lay a t a terminal point for different-gauge rail lines;
but the decision also reflected the great current concern for security
from enemy attacks on Australia. With plans for four all-weather
runways, for satellite fields, for the garrisoning there of 4,600 military
personnel, and for depot facilities requiring a staff of 2,000 workers,
the project was indeed an ambitious undertaking5' Yet, with an early
improvement in the tactical situation, it became necessary before the
Tocumwal depot had even reached its operational capacity to transfer
the main center of such activity northward to Townsville, which was
considerably nearer the area of combat in New Guinea."
On the eve of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which would determine
the immediate fate of Australia, many problems remained unsolved.
Of these, logistical problems were among the most difficult. Distances
in Australia were comparable to those of the United States, but trans-
portation and communication facilities were much less adequate. Rail-
way lines, like the population, were centered in the southeastern part
of the country, and there was no railroad connection with such
northern outposts as Darwin. Moreover, where connections existed
for any great distance there were special difficulties arising from the
fact that the Australian railways were not of uniform gauge. Particu-
larly serious was the problem of storing and transporting high-octane
gasoline. Stocks at the outset were relatively small and were not stra-
tegically located. Most of the storage capacity being in the southern
part of the continent, it was necessary to unload there bulk shipments
from the United States. Rail shipment thence to operating units in
the north was almost out of question, for every change in railroad
gauge required the pumping of fuel from one tank car to another.
Transshipment, therefore, had to be made largely by water roiltes
exposed to enemy attack, and this arrangement called for a large sup-
ply of fuel drums to be sent from the United States. The relatively
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