Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
same time, civilian factory representatives of the several American
aircraft producers became well-nigh indispensable in the training of
service personnel, particularly by guiding them to an understanding
of the peculiar features of the several types of a i r ~ r a f t . ' ~
Work on a permanent supply and maintenance depot a t Tocumwal
in New South Wales, between Melbourne and Canberra, was in
progress by May. In selection of the site, the authorities had been in-
fluenced by previous RAAF plans for a similar use of the place, by
its convenient situation with reference to Melbourne and Sydney, and
by the fact that it lay a t a terminal point for different-gauge rail lines;
but the decision also reflected the great current concern for security
from enemy attacks on Australia. With plans for four all-weather
runways, for satellite fields, for the garrisoning there of 4,600 military
personnel, and for depot facilities requiring a staff of 2,000 workers,
the project was indeed an ambitious undertaking5' Yet, with an early
improvement in the tactical situation, it became necessary before the
Tocumwal depot had even reached its operational capacity to transfer
the main center of such activity northward to Townsville, which was
considerably nearer the area of combat in New Guinea."
On the eve of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which would determine
the immediate fate of Australia, many problems remained unsolved.
Of these, logistical problems were among the most difficult. Distances
in Australia were comparable to those of the United States, but trans-
portation and communication facilities were much less adequate. Rail-
way lines, like the population, were centered in the southeastern part
of the country, and there was no railroad connection with such
northern outposts as Darwin. Moreover, where connections existed
for any great distance there were special difficulties arising from the
fact that the Australian railways were not of uniform gauge. Particu-
larly serious was the problem of storing and transporting high-octane
gasoline. Stocks at the outset were relatively small and were not stra-
tegically located. Most of the storage capacity being in the southern
part of the continent, it was necessary to unload there bulk shipments
from the United States. Rail shipment thence to operating units in
the north was almost out of question, for every change in railroad
gauge required the pumping of fuel from one tank car to another.
Transshipment, therefore, had to be made largely by water roiltes
exposed to enemy attack, and this arrangement called for a large sup-
ply of fuel drums to be sent from the United States. The relatively
423

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.