The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
same time, civilian factory representatives of the several American
aircraft producers became well-nigh indispensable in the training of
service personnel, particularly by guiding them to an understanding
of the peculiar features of the several types of a i r ~ r a f t . ' ~
Work on a permanent supply and maintenance depot a t Tocumwal
in New South Wales, between Melbourne and Canberra, was in
progress by May. In selection of the site, the authorities had been in-
fluenced by previous RAAF plans for a similar use of the place, by
its convenient situation with reference to Melbourne and Sydney, and
by the fact that it lay a t a terminal point for different-gauge rail lines;
but the decision also reflected the great current concern for security
from enemy attacks on Australia. With plans for four all-weather
runways, for satellite fields, for the garrisoning there of 4,600 military
personnel, and for depot facilities requiring a staff of 2,000 workers,
the project was indeed an ambitious undertaking5' Yet, with an early
improvement in the tactical situation, it became necessary before the
Tocumwal depot had even reached its operational capacity to transfer
the main center of such activity northward to Townsville, which was
considerably nearer the area of combat in New Guinea."
On the eve of the Battle of the Coral Sea, which would determine
the immediate fate of Australia, many problems remained unsolved.
Of these, logistical problems were among the most difficult. Distances
in Australia were comparable to those of the United States, but trans-
portation and communication facilities were much less adequate. Rail-
way lines, like the population, were centered in the southeastern part
of the country, and there was no railroad connection with such
northern outposts as Darwin. Moreover, where connections existed
for any great distance there were special difficulties arising from the
fact that the Australian railways were not of uniform gauge. Particu-
larly serious was the problem of storing and transporting high-octane
gasoline. Stocks at the outset were relatively small and were not stra-
tegically located. Most of the storage capacity being in the southern
part of the continent, it was necessary to unload there bulk shipments
from the United States. Rail shipment thence to operating units in
the north was almost out of question, for every change in railroad
gauge required the pumping of fuel from one tank car to another.
Transshipment, therefore, had to be made largely by water roiltes
exposed to enemy attack, and this arrangement called for a large sup-
ply of fuel drums to be sent from the United States. The relatively
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