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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
He showed greater concern, however, for modification of certain
features in both American and Australian organization that would pro-
vide a higher degree of flexibility in the employment of air units.
Though for a time an attempt was made to hold the American groups
intact, they were soon divided to provide individual squadrons for
defense of the more exposed areas, and General Brett came to feel
that the squadron rather than the group would prove the basic tactical
unit in later offensive operations. He proposed the establishment of
air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate
any number of squadrons assigned under a general plan to concentrate
tactical units in accordance with a changing tactical situation, and
with a view to providing a command structure that in itself would be
flexible enough to move forward in offensive operations as the occa-
sion required. Such a headquarters would remain in the original area
only for so long as it was necessary and then, in General Brett’s words,
“would leap-frog to take up a command a t some newly acquired
point.” 4 6 Inadequate personnel and other considerations made it im-
possible to follow this proposal, but General Brett sought greater
flexibility of control by the establishment on 4 May 1942 of U.S. Air
Commands No. I and No. 2 , located respectively in the northwest and
northeast defensive areas. Commanded by Col. Albert L. Sneed a t
Darwin and Brig. Gen. Martin F. Scanlon at Townsville, the two
headquarters were supposed to be prepared for direction of all types
of air operations. Actually, the American planes remained subject to
the control of the area commanders, and before the month was out the
two commands had been dissolved and their planes had been assigned
for operations, in the one instance, to the commanding general of the
land forces of the Northern Territory and, in the other, to the com-
mander of the New Guinea Force. Though it was understood that
these officers, who were themselves directly responsible to the com-
mander of the Allied Land Forces, would not interfere with a control
of air operations by air officers except in the event of an imminent
attack, there was a feeling among AAF personnel that an effective
organization remained yet to be attained.4T
On the other hand, there was cause for satisfaction with decisions
reached regarding the organization of air service. On 2 7 April ;i new
command, the United States Army Air Services under Maj. Gen.
Rush B. Lincoln, took over the responsibility for air service from
USAFIA. At first there was some confusion as to the extent and exact
42 1

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