The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
He showed greater concern, however, for modification of certain
features in both American and Australian organization that would pro-
vide a higher degree of flexibility in the employment of air units.
Though for a time an attempt was made to hold the American groups
intact, they were soon divided to provide individual squadrons for
defense of the more exposed areas, and General Brett came to feel
that the squadron rather than the group would prove the basic tactical
unit in later offensive operations. He proposed the establishment of
air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate
any number of squadrons assigned under a general plan to concentrate
tactical units in accordance with a changing tactical situation, and
with a view to providing a command structure that in itself would be
flexible enough to move forward in offensive operations as the occa-
sion required. Such a headquarters would remain in the original area
only for so long as it was necessary and then, in General Brett’s words,
“would leap-frog to take up a command a t some newly acquired
point.” 4 6 Inadequate personnel and other considerations made it im-
possible to follow this proposal, but General Brett sought greater
flexibility of control by the establishment on 4 May 1942 of U.S. Air
Commands No. I and No. 2 , located respectively in the northwest and
northeast defensive areas. Commanded by Col. Albert L. Sneed a t
Darwin and Brig. Gen. Martin F. Scanlon at Townsville, the two
headquarters were supposed to be prepared for direction of all types
of air operations. Actually, the American planes remained subject to
the control of the area commanders, and before the month was out the
two commands had been dissolved and their planes had been assigned
for operations, in the one instance, to the commanding general of the
land forces of the Northern Territory and, in the other, to the com-
mander of the New Guinea Force. Though it was understood that
these officers, who were themselves directly responsible to the com-
mander of the Allied Land Forces, would not interfere with a control
of air operations by air officers except in the event of an imminent
attack, there was a feeling among AAF personnel that an effective
organization remained yet to be attained.4T
On the other hand, there was cause for satisfaction with decisions
reached regarding the organization of air service. On 2 7 April ;i new
command, the United States Army Air Services under Maj. Gen.
Rush B. Lincoln, took over the responsibility for air service from
USAFIA. At first there was some confusion as to the extent and exact
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