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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Herbert F. Leary, Commander of Allied Naval Forces; Lt. Gen.
Jonathan M. Wainwright, Commander of Forces in the Philippines;
and Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in
Australia.’
General Brett assumed command of the Allied Air Forces on 2 0
April, with assignment to his command of the control of all AAF
tactical units and associated service elements of the U.S. Army then
in Australia, and operational control, except for training, of the
RAAF and the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air F ~ r c e . ’ ~The
necessity of adapting his plans to the existing defensive organization
of Australia, a shortage of American staff personnel, an unavoidable
dependence upon the RAAF for communications and administrative
facilities, and a purpose to merge the several components into a truly
unified force were reflected in a balance between Australian and
American officers in the air staff announced on 2 May as follows: Air
Vice Marshal William D. Bostock, RAAF, chief of staff; Col. Edwin
S. Perrin, deputy chief of staff; Brig. Gen. Ralph Royce, senior air
staff officer; Col. Eugene L. Eubank, director of plans; Col. Ross G.
Hoyt, director of operations; Air Commodore Joseph C. Hewitt,
RAAF, director of intelligence; Group Capt. F.R.W. Scherger,
RAAF, director of defense; and Group Capt. Carn S. Wiggins, RAAF,
director of communications.43
Actually, the extent of Australian influence was considerably greater
than at first glance would appear. General Brett a t no time held ad-
ministrative control of RAAF units, and AAF dependence on the
Australians gave to them a substantial degree of administrative and
even operational control of the American units. Australian administra-
tive forms, unfamiliar and frequently confusing to the Americans,
were used; Australian officers by virtue of rank filled a majority of
the key command positions at the bases from which the Americans
operated; operational control, moreover, would be implemented
through the five military areas into which Australia was divided, each
of which was commanded by an Australian ~fficer.~’Indeed, one of-
ficial report went so far as to describe Australian control as extending
to “every echelon of American Air Forces and every airfield at which
they are stationed.” ‘‘ Personal and official relations remained good,
but it was natural that General Brett should seek the assignment to
his command of American staff officers of sufficient experience and
rank to provide a better balance.
4 2 0

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.