“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Herbert F. Leary, Commander of Allied Naval Forces; Lt. Gen.
Jonathan M. Wainwright, Commander of Forces in the Philippines;
and Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in
Australia.’
General Brett assumed command of the Allied Air Forces on 2 0
April, with assignment to his command of the control of all AAF
tactical units and associated service elements of the U.S. Army then
in Australia, and operational control, except for training, of the
RAAF and the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air F ~ r c e . ’ ~The
necessity of adapting his plans to the existing defensive organization
of Australia, a shortage of American staff personnel, an unavoidable
dependence upon the RAAF for communications and administrative
facilities, and a purpose to merge the several components into a truly
unified force were reflected in a balance between Australian and
American officers in the air staff announced on 2 May as follows: Air
Vice Marshal William D. Bostock, RAAF, chief of staff; Col. Edwin
S. Perrin, deputy chief of staff; Brig. Gen. Ralph Royce, senior air
staff officer; Col. Eugene L. Eubank, director of plans; Col. Ross G.
Hoyt, director of operations; Air Commodore Joseph C. Hewitt,
RAAF, director of intelligence; Group Capt. F.R.W. Scherger,
RAAF, director of defense; and Group Capt. Carn S. Wiggins, RAAF,
director of communications.43
Actually, the extent of Australian influence was considerably greater
than at first glance would appear. General Brett a t no time held ad-
ministrative control of RAAF units, and AAF dependence on the
Australians gave to them a substantial degree of administrative and
even operational control of the American units. Australian administra-
tive forms, unfamiliar and frequently confusing to the Americans,
were used; Australian officers by virtue of rank filled a majority of
the key command positions at the bases from which the Americans
operated; operational control, moreover, would be implemented
through the five military areas into which Australia was divided, each
of which was commanded by an Australian ~fficer.~’Indeed, one of-
ficial report went so far as to describe Australian control as extending
to “every echelon of American Air Forces and every airfield at which
they are stationed.” ‘‘ Personal and official relations remained good,
but it was natural that General Brett should seek the assignment to
his command of American staff officers of sufficient experience and
rank to provide a better balance.
4 2 0