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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
arate problems of defense at either extremity of the so-called Malay
barrier. Moreover, in the organization of defensive efforts in the
Pacific, as with those to be mounted in the China-Burma-India area,
the double threat of a Japanese advance from Rabaul by way of New
Guinea to Australia and from the same point by way of the Solomons
against the South Pacific line of communications presented its own
peculiar problems of organization and co-ordination. The Combined
Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that the Pacific should be primarily
an area of American responsibility, but among the Joint Chiefs the
question of Army and Navy responsibilities within this theater oc-
casioned some debate. A workable agreement was soon reached, how-
ever, on the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area under the command of General
MacArthur; the remainder of the Pacific would be divided into the
Southeast Pacific and the Pacific Ocean areas, the latter to be sub-
divided under naval command into the North, Central, and South
Pacific. Forces in the adjoining South Pacific Area, which included
New Zealand and New Caledonia, thus would operate under the com-
mand of Adm. Chester W. Nimitz as commander in chief of the
Pacific Ocean Area, whose responsibilities included the maintenance
of a line of communications between the United States and the South-
west Pacific, the support of operations in that area, and preparation
for offensive action that might be separately or jointly ~ n d e r t a k e n . ~ ~
By the end of March, a directive for General MacArthur had been
drafted and submitted to the Allied governments concerned. Under
its provisions, the responsibilities of the new command were to check
the enemy's advance toward Australia; to exert all possible pressure
on the enemy; to protect land, sea, and air communications within the
theater; to support friendly forces of the Pacific Ocean Area; and to
make suitable preparations for a later assumption of the offensive."
In accordance with this directive, which meantime had undergone
only slight modification, General MacArthur assumed command of
the Southwest Pacific Area on 1 8 April 1942. The immediate prob-
lem in the direction of operations was to provide for a co-ordination
of effort between Australian and American forces and the few Dutch
units which had escaped from the Netherlands East Indies. Accord-
ingly, the staff of the new command was announced as follows: Gen.
Sir Thomas Blarney, Commander of Allied Land Forces; Lt. Gen.
George H. Brett, Commander of Allied Air Forces; Vice Adm.
4'9

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.