“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
arate problems of defense at either extremity of the so-called Malay
barrier. Moreover, in the organization of defensive efforts in the
Pacific, as with those to be mounted in the China-Burma-India area,
the double threat of a Japanese advance from Rabaul by way of New
Guinea to Australia and from the same point by way of the Solomons
against the South Pacific line of communications presented its own
peculiar problems of organization and co-ordination. The Combined
Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that the Pacific should be primarily
an area of American responsibility, but among the Joint Chiefs the
question of Army and Navy responsibilities within this theater oc-
casioned some debate. A workable agreement was soon reached, how-
ever, on the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area under the command of General
MacArthur; the remainder of the Pacific would be divided into the
Southeast Pacific and the Pacific Ocean areas, the latter to be sub-
divided under naval command into the North, Central, and South
Pacific. Forces in the adjoining South Pacific Area, which included
New Zealand and New Caledonia, thus would operate under the com-
mand of Adm. Chester W. Nimitz as commander in chief of the
Pacific Ocean Area, whose responsibilities included the maintenance
of a line of communications between the United States and the South-
west Pacific, the support of operations in that area, and preparation
for offensive action that might be separately or jointly ~ n d e r t a k e n . ~ ~
By the end of March, a directive for General MacArthur had been
drafted and submitted to the Allied governments concerned. Under
its provisions, the responsibilities of the new command were to check
the enemy's advance toward Australia; to exert all possible pressure
on the enemy; to protect land, sea, and air communications within the
theater; to support friendly forces of the Pacific Ocean Area; and to
make suitable preparations for a later assumption of the offensive."
In accordance with this directive, which meantime had undergone
only slight modification, General MacArthur assumed command of
the Southwest Pacific Area on 1 8 April 1942. The immediate prob-
lem in the direction of operations was to provide for a co-ordination
of effort between Australian and American forces and the few Dutch
units which had escaped from the Netherlands East Indies. Accord-
ingly, the staff of the new command was announced as follows: Gen.
Sir Thomas Blarney, Commander of Allied Land Forces; Lt. Gen.
George H. Brett, Commander of Allied Air Forces; Vice Adm.
4'9