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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I
fight a t a disadvantage. One day mission was sufficiently large and suc-
cessful to draw more than passing attention. O n 9 October, with some
French reinforcements, Mitchell was able to employ a force of about
2 0 0 bombers escorted by some I 10 pursuits and 50 three-place planes.
With these he attacked and disorganized German army reserves gath-
ering in the rear for a counterattack. T h e German air defense was
overwhelmed, and the area bombed with telling effect. Thirty-two
tons of bombs were dropped in this mission; subsequent operations
during the same day and the following night brought the total for
twenty-four hours to sixty-nine tons.sQIt was probably the Air Serv-
ice’s most notable bombardment effort during the war.
An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this mission:
T h e bombing squadrons which made up this air fleet probably represent the
first definite American unit of major importance in the independent air forces
which are being built up by the Entente powers. This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe from the rain of bombs. It is a thing
apart from the fighting, observation, and bombing squadrons attached to the
various army corps. T h e work of the independent force is bombing munitions
works, factories, cities, and other important centers far behind the German
lines. It has been promised that eventually Berlin itself will know what an
air raid means, and the whole great project is a direct answer to the German
air attacks on helpless and unfortified British, French, and Belgian cities.*O
When war ended, the Air Service had not begun such attacks. Their
total “rain of bombs” for the war was about 1 3 8 tons-or, to use the
more impressive figure of the official report, 275,000 pounds. Their
deepest penetration behind German lines was 160 miles.41 Even by
the correspondent’s own definition the attack of 9 October was hardly
an independent mission. T h e sudden collapse of Germany made him
a false prophet, but his predictions were better grounded than rhose of
early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its commander, Trenchard, directly responsible to
the Air Ministry. Its mission was strategic bombardment-in Germany
when possible-and its operations had slowly mounted in intensity.
T h e principle behind this organization had been grudgingly accepted
by the French, and on 3 October the constitution of an Inter-Allied
Independent Air Force, also directed by Trenchard but “under the
Supreme Command of Marshal Foch for operation,” had been agreed
upon.42T h e Air Service was to have participated in this combined
force, which was still a paper organization when the Armistice came.
‘ 5

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.