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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I fight a t a disadvantage. One day mission was sufficiently large and suc- cessful to draw more than passing attention. O n 9 October, with some French reinforcements, Mitchell was able to employ a force of about 2 0 0 bombers escorted by some I 10 pursuits and 50 three-place planes. With these he attacked and disorganized German army reserves gath- ering in the rear for a counterattack. T h e German air defense was overwhelmed, and the area bombed with telling effect. Thirty-two tons of bombs were dropped in this mission; subsequent operations during the same day and the following night brought the total for twenty-four hours to sixty-nine tons.sQIt was probably the Air Serv- ice’s most notable bombardment effort during the war. An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this mission: T h e bombing squadrons which made up this air fleet probably represent the first definite American unit of major importance in the independent air forces which are being built up by the Entente powers. This navy of the air is to be expanded until no part of Germany is safe from the rain of bombs. It is a thing apart from the fighting, observation, and bombing squadrons attached to the various army corps. T h e work of the independent force is bombing munitions works, factories, cities, and other important centers far behind the German lines. It has been promised that eventually Berlin itself will know what an air raid means, and the whole great project is a direct answer to the German air attacks on helpless and unfortified British, French, and Belgian cities.*O When war ended, the Air Service had not begun such attacks. Their total “rain of bombs” for the war was about 1 3 8 tons-or, to use the more impressive figure of the official report, 275,000 pounds. Their deepest penetration behind German lines was 160 miles.41 Even by the correspondent’s own definition the attack of 9 October was hardly an independent mission. T h e sudden collapse of Germany made him a false prophet, but his predictions were better grounded than rhose of early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been established with its commander, Trenchard, directly responsible to the Air Ministry. Its mission was strategic bombardment-in Germany when possible-and its operations had slowly mounted in intensity. T h e principle behind this organization had been grudgingly accepted by the French, and on 3 October the constitution of an Inter-Allied Independent Air Force, also directed by Trenchard but “under the Supreme Command of Marshal Foch for operation,” had been agreed upon.42T h e Air Service was to have participated in this combined force, which was still a paper organization when the Armistice came. ‘ 5
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