The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A I R S E R V I C E I N W O R L D W A R I
fight a t a disadvantage. One day mission was sufficiently large and suc-
cessful to draw more than passing attention. O n 9 October, with some
French reinforcements, Mitchell was able to employ a force of about
2 0 0 bombers escorted by some I 10 pursuits and 50 three-place planes.
With these he attacked and disorganized German army reserves gath-
ering in the rear for a counterattack. T h e German air defense was
overwhelmed, and the area bombed with telling effect. Thirty-two
tons of bombs were dropped in this mission; subsequent operations
during the same day and the following night brought the total for
twenty-four hours to sixty-nine tons.sQIt was probably the Air Serv-
ice’s most notable bombardment effort during the war.
An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this mission:
T h e bombing squadrons which made up this air fleet probably represent the
first definite American unit of major importance in the independent air forces
which are being built up by the Entente powers. This navy of the air is to be
expanded until no part of Germany is safe from the rain of bombs. It is a thing
apart from the fighting, observation, and bombing squadrons attached to the
various army corps. T h e work of the independent force is bombing munitions
works, factories, cities, and other important centers far behind the German
lines. It has been promised that eventually Berlin itself will know what an
air raid means, and the whole great project is a direct answer to the German
air attacks on helpless and unfortified British, French, and Belgian cities.*O
When war ended, the Air Service had not begun such attacks. Their
total “rain of bombs” for the war was about 1 3 8 tons-or, to use the
more impressive figure of the official report, 275,000 pounds. Their
deepest penetration behind German lines was 160 miles.41 Even by
the correspondent’s own definition the attack of 9 October was hardly
an independent mission. T h e sudden collapse of Germany made him
a false prophet, but his predictions were better grounded than rhose of
early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been
established with its commander, Trenchard, directly responsible to
the Air Ministry. Its mission was strategic bombardment-in Germany
when possible-and its operations had slowly mounted in intensity.
T h e principle behind this organization had been grudgingly accepted
by the French, and on 3 October the constitution of an Inter-Allied
Independent Air Force, also directed by Trenchard but “under the
Supreme Command of Marshal Foch for operation,” had been agreed
upon.42T h e Air Service was to have participated in this combined
force, which was still a paper organization when the Armistice came.
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