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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
leaguered garrisons,36and plans for a special mission were completed
a t a conference attended by General George, Col. John H. Davies,
and others in Melbourne on 7 April. Accordingly, in the early morn-
ing of 11 April, ten B-25’s equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks and
three B-17’s took off from Darwin for the 1,500-mile flight to Min-
danao. General Royce was in command; Colonel Davies led the €3-2 5’9
and Capt. Frank Bostrom the B- I 7’s. All planes having arrived safely
at Del Monte, the B-25’~were then dispersed to neighboring auxiliary
fields. During the next two days attacks were made against shipping
and docks at Cebu, air and harbor facilities at Davao, and Nichols
Field on Luzon. The six badly worn and battered pursuit planes avail-
able on Mindanao were used in attempts to pin down enemy fighters
at near-by Davao airfield, and for protection of the bombers in land-
ing and taking off. They were unequal to the task, although during
the period they flew more sorties than the bombers. Enemy bombings
of Del Monte destroyed one of the B- I 7’s and seriously damaged the
other two. Indeed, only two heavy bomber sorties were completed,
one against Nichols Field and the other against shipping targets in
Cebu harbor. The B-25’s operated from better-concealed strips, and
in over twenty sorties sank one and possibly two other transports and
shot down three enemy a i r ~ r a f t . ~ ?
The American flyers returned to Australia with the loss of only one
B-17 and no casualties. The scope of the mission had been indeed
record-breaking; Captain Bostrum, for example, recorded thirty-eight
hours in the air and in all had flown approximately 6,000 nautical
miles to drop a load of bombs on Nichols Field. But one load of bombs
could count for little in the final checkup, and some of the participants
questioned whether the results justified the extraordinary effort re-
quired. Others returned with a memory chiefly of gallant men who
had serviced their planes on Mindanao-men who already knew their
doom. For this was the last major attempt to fly across the far-flung
battle lines to their aid.38
The Allied Air Forces
Meanwhile, in Australia and in Washington consultations proceeded
on urgent questions of command and organization. The dissolution of
the ABDA Command had left no provision for an over-all command
of Allied resistance to the southward thrust of the Japanese. Their
conquest of the Netherlands East Indies had created distinctly sep-
4’8

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.