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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A below in fact prohibited flights except at certain hours of the day.32 It is not surprising, then, that with no more than a dozen B-17’s in commission, the effort that could be made served principally to pro- vide reconnaissance for the Allies and an occasional harassment of the enemy. Between 23 February and I April, the B-17’s flew approxi- mately twelve missions, of which number six were directed against Rabaul, one against Koepang in Timor, and four against targets in the Lae-Salamaua area. T h e small scale of the effort receives additional emphasis from the fact that the six Rabaul missions actually put a total of only fifteen B-17’s over the target, or an average of less than three planes per mission. T h e weather was frequently unfavorable, mechani- cal difficulties at times interfered, and enemy reaction was likely to be vigorous. Claims of two hits on heavy cruisers were unsubstantiated. In short, the value of these missions lay chiefly in the intelligence acquired.33 Attacks directed against Lae and Salamaua sought to neutralize these points as staging bases for air raids on Port Moresby. Air units in Australia were as yet in no condition to undertake more than a few sorties, but the Navy had two carriers within reach and on 10 March, just two days after the enemy’s landings in the Huon Gulf, 104 planes took off from the Lexington and Yorktown in the Gulf of Papua. Fly- ing through a pass in the Owen Stanley range, they swarmed over the Japanese landing craft at Lae and Salamaua. With the loss of only one plane, they returned to enter claims for the sinking of five transports and a number of war vessels, though later reports indicate that a cruiser and three destroyers had been damaged rather than sunk. Eight B - I ~ ’ s ,following hard upon the Navy planes, damaged one transport and reported that at the conclusion of this joint undertaking four ships were left burning, two sinking, and another All told, it was a successful effort, but it did not dislodge the enemy and thereafter Lae and Salamaua became principal objectives of land-based air attack. T h e most ambitious single effort of these early days in Australia was directed once more against the Philippines rather than New Guinea or the Bismarcks. Late in March, General Wainwright had requested that a squadron of bombers be sent, in the hope that they might break the Japanese blockade long enough to permit the move- ment of supplies from Cebu to C ~ r r e g i d o r . ~ ~General MacArthur himself was reluctant to abandon all hope of assistance to the be- 4’ 7
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