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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
below in fact prohibited flights except at certain hours of the day.32
It is not surprising, then, that with no more than a dozen B-17’s in
commission, the effort that could be made served principally to pro-
vide reconnaissance for the Allies and an occasional harassment of the
enemy. Between 23 February and I April, the B-17’s flew approxi-
mately twelve missions, of which number six were directed against
Rabaul, one against Koepang in Timor, and four against targets in the
Lae-Salamaua area. T h e small scale of the effort receives additional
emphasis from the fact that the six Rabaul missions actually put a total
of only fifteen B-17’s over the target, or an average of less than three
planes per mission. T h e weather was frequently unfavorable, mechani-
cal difficulties at times interfered, and enemy reaction was likely to be
vigorous. Claims of two hits on heavy cruisers were unsubstantiated.
In short, the value of these missions lay chiefly in the intelligence
acquired.33
Attacks directed against Lae and Salamaua sought to neutralize
these points as staging bases for air raids on Port Moresby. Air units in
Australia were as yet in no condition to undertake more than a few
sorties, but the Navy had two carriers within reach and on 10 March,
just two days after the enemy’s landings in the Huon Gulf, 104 planes
took off from the Lexington and Yorktown in the Gulf of Papua. Fly-
ing through a pass in the Owen Stanley range, they swarmed over the
Japanese landing craft at Lae and Salamaua. With the loss of only one
plane, they returned to enter claims for the sinking of five transports
and a number of war vessels, though later reports indicate that a
cruiser and three destroyers had been damaged rather than sunk.
Eight B - I ~ ’ s ,following hard upon the Navy planes, damaged one
transport and reported that at the conclusion of this joint undertaking
four ships were left burning, two sinking, and another All
told, it was a successful effort, but it did not dislodge the enemy and
thereafter Lae and Salamaua became principal objectives of land-based
air attack.
T h e most ambitious single effort of these early days in Australia
was directed once more against the Philippines rather than New
Guinea or the Bismarcks. Late in March, General Wainwright had
requested that a squadron of bombers be sent, in the hope that they
might break the Japanese blockade long enough to permit the move-
ment of supplies from Cebu to C ~ r r e g i d o r . ~ ~General MacArthur
himself was reluctant to abandon all hope of assistance to the be-
4’ 7

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