Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 47 …s Independent Force, the whole of the French Air Division (strategic reserve), and Italian and Portuguese…
  • p. 113 …Japanese Air Power The Japanese air forces, divided into separate army and navy air arms, had…
  • p. 119 …naval air service, and a colonial air force.” For their air doctrines, the Italians depended almost…
  • p. 120 …In its first “combat” test during the thirties the Italian Air Force faced no real opposition…
  • p. 121 …The hope was not fulfilled, for numerous weaknesses in the Italian Air Force rapidly came to…
  • p. 122 …The fundamental weakness of the Italian Air Force was not in its theory of air power…
  • p. 197 …naval forces, and within prescribed boundaries to destroy any German and Italian naval, air, and ground…
  • p. 386 …More threatening were Rommel’s forces in North Africa, for the very existence of the air…
  • p. 554 …Chennault, who since 1937 had been serving as special adviser to the Chinese Air Force. Known…
  • p. 705 …Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, to England for study of the problem. Specifically, he was…
  • p. 752 …USSBS, Japanese Air Power. 9. Notes on the Italian Air Force, in special file of Brig…
  • p. 805 …History, First Air Force. 44. History, Caribbean Air Force, 8 May 1941-6 Mar. 1942, p…
  • p. 851 …E S Italian Air Force: 82-85; development, Italian East Africa, 84 Italy, Air Ministry, 82…
  • p. 857 …See Italian Air Force. Reinforcements. See theaters. Renault works, 593 Replacement Control Depot, ~ z t h…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
below in fact prohibited flights except at certain hours of the day.32
It is not surprising, then, that with no more than a dozen B-17’s in
commission, the effort that could be made served principally to pro-
vide reconnaissance for the Allies and an occasional harassment of the
enemy. Between 23 February and I April, the B-17’s flew approxi-
mately twelve missions, of which number six were directed against
Rabaul, one against Koepang in Timor, and four against targets in the
Lae-Salamaua area. T h e small scale of the effort receives additional
emphasis from the fact that the six Rabaul missions actually put a total
of only fifteen B-17’s over the target, or an average of less than three
planes per mission. T h e weather was frequently unfavorable, mechani-
cal difficulties at times interfered, and enemy reaction was likely to be
vigorous. Claims of two hits on heavy cruisers were unsubstantiated.
In short, the value of these missions lay chiefly in the intelligence
acquired.33
Attacks directed against Lae and Salamaua sought to neutralize
these points as staging bases for air raids on Port Moresby. Air units in
Australia were as yet in no condition to undertake more than a few
sorties, but the Navy had two carriers within reach and on 10 March,
just two days after the enemy’s landings in the Huon Gulf, 104 planes
took off from the Lexington and Yorktown in the Gulf of Papua. Fly-
ing through a pass in the Owen Stanley range, they swarmed over the
Japanese landing craft at Lae and Salamaua. With the loss of only one
plane, they returned to enter claims for the sinking of five transports
and a number of war vessels, though later reports indicate that a
cruiser and three destroyers had been damaged rather than sunk.
Eight B - I ~ ’ s ,following hard upon the Navy planes, damaged one
transport and reported that at the conclusion of this joint undertaking
four ships were left burning, two sinking, and another All
told, it was a successful effort, but it did not dislodge the enemy and
thereafter Lae and Salamaua became principal objectives of land-based
air attack.
T h e most ambitious single effort of these early days in Australia
was directed once more against the Philippines rather than New
Guinea or the Bismarcks. Late in March, General Wainwright had
requested that a squadron of bombers be sent, in the hope that they
might break the Japanese blockade long enough to permit the move-
ment of supplies from Cebu to C ~ r r e g i d o r . ~ ~General MacArthur
himself was reluctant to abandon all hope of assistance to the be-
4’ 7

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.