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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 It was the latter part of March before these raids could be seriously opposed. But on 14 March a flight of the 49th Pursuit Group recently stationed on Horn Island off the northern tip of Cape York, under command of Capt. Robert L. Morrisey, surprised and shot down five enemy planes. T w o days later an advance echelon of the 49th moved with its p-40’~to Darwin, and this was followed on 19 March by the 9th Squadron, which recorded its first four kills before the month was out. By this time, too, P-40’s were rising to the defense of Port Moresby. Flown by the RAAF’s 75 Squadron, their presence proved a tonic to the Australian garrison which already had dubbed the American pursuit planes “Tomorrowhawks” in token of their long anticipated arrival.31 Though limited in number and forced to operate under other serious difficulties, the heavy bombers also made their contribution to a growing defensive effort. The logical target for the B-17 was Rabaul. Possessed of well-nigh unlimited possibilities for expansion as an air base and of a harbor capable of sheltering the largest warships, it stood as a major threat to the Allied position both in Australia and along the South Pacific route. Missions against this target, therefore, were flown in fulfilment of a double responsibility imposed upon our air forces in Australia-to assist in the immediate protection of that continent and of the life line which joined it to Hawaii and the United States. Such missions, however, could be flown only with the greatest expenditure of time and effort. Until sufficient Allied air power could be moved forward to assert control of the air over lower New Guinea, it was necessary to base the big bombers back at Townsville. T o strike a t Rabaul, they were forced to fly the 600 miles to Port Moresby late in the afternoon preceding the mission; during the night there they would be bombed up and refueled for an early morning take-off. Neither the Townsville nor the Port Moresby areas possessed main- tenance equipment and service personnel adequate to keep modern aircraft in fighting trim. At Port Moresby, where there was only one field adequate for bombardment operations, base facilities were par- ticularly primitive. But the hazards of operating off such landing fields were slight in comparison with those of flying across the Owen Stanley range, whose peaks rose up to 13,000 feet and whose passes were rarely below 7,000. Over these mountains weather played hob with bombardment schedules. Frequent storms, down drafts, and al- most impenetrable mists which rose daily from the jungle terrain 416
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