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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
Group was in any condition for immediate employment. T h e experi-
ence in Java had shattered the morale of their battle-wearied crews,
and the fourteen B-17’s rescued from the disaster there were all in
depot for repair. Indeed, the twelve B-I 7’s available for operations
were for the moment in the anomalous position of not being even
under American command. Both the planes and the crews, some of
which had flown into Oahu during the Japanese attack on 7 December,
belonged to the 2 2d Bombardment Squadron and the 88th Reconnais-
sance Squadron of the 7th Group, but after flying search missions out
of Hawaii for two months, they had been attached to Naval Task
Force ANZAC early in February for assistance in protection of the
South Pacific line of supply. Under the command of Maj. Richard H.
Carmichael, the flight had flown twelve missions from the Fiji Islands
prior to its arrival at Townsville in Australia on I 8 and I 9 February.
In the absence of official notification of their coming, USAFIA had
made no arrangements for maintenance, supply, or administration. For
a few days they had remained under naval control, during which time
six of the planes flew the first American bomber mission against Rabaul
on 2 3 February, and then they were transferred to control of the
RAAF.’5
By the end of March the heavy bomber situation had been some-
what clarified. Planes and crews of the 7th Group had been assigned
to the 19th, which, near Townsville, was in process of reorganization
and preparation for combat under the command of Lt. Col. Kenneth
B. Hobson. For the second heavy bombardment group committed to
Australia the choice had fallen on the 43d Group, and its ground
echelon had now arrived. But it would be months before the 43d
entered operations. AAF plans had called for dispatch of two B-17’s
a day to Australia after 2 0 March, with the purpose of building up
and maintaining a minimum of forty heavy bombers for each of the
two groups. T h e W a r Department subsequently decided, however,
to reconsider allocations to all theaters, and by the end of March only
nine of the bombers had reached Australia. A new decision on the
combined staff level did not appreciably alter the earlier commitment
to the Southwest Pacific. There would be eighty operational aircraft
with the addition of forty in reserve, but plans for their movement to
the theater called for the dispatch of only thirty in April and the
remainder as soon thereafter as was possible.26
Light bombardment units were also undergoing regrouping and
4’ 3

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.