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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
which was the 8th, had disembarked at Brisbane on 10 March, but
only the 49th Group, which had come in early in February, was con-
sidered ready for combat. The explanation for this and similar delays
in preparing other units is readily revealed by a glance at the level of
experience of the 49th’~1 0 2 pilots at the time of their arrival in the
theater. Lt. Col. Paul B. Wurtsmith, its commanding officer, and his
executive, Maj. Donald R. Hutchinson, were veteran pilots with 4,800
and 2,600 hours of pursuit time, respectively. Five other pilots had
more than 600 hours, and nine were credited with about 15 hours,
but the remaining eighty-nine pilots had no pursuit time at all.22As
for the 35th, its more experienced pilots had been drafted for service
with the provisional squadrons hurriedly organized for operation in
the Netherlands East Indies, and such of them as had survived had
been assigned to rest and recuperation in the hope that their battle
experience might soon be put to use in the training of other pilots.
Once again men struggled against the disadvantages that had beset
their efforts in the Philippines and then in the Netherlands East Indies.
They worked against time, enjoyed few of the benefits of previous
preparation, and improvised as they went, in an attempt to meet the
changing requirements of a highly fluid tactical situation. An organi-
zation geared to the requirements of service and supply for operations
in Java had to be readjusted to the tactical demands of a defense of
Australia, Once more it was necessary to integrate activities with those
of an ally; the Americans were dependent upon the Australians for
communications and were forced to rely heavily upon them in all
matters of administration; and once more good will on both sides was
in itself insufficient to overcome all of the difficulties. The penalties
of haste proved to be none the less because the haste was unavoidable.
Although General Brett early in January had urged upon the authori-
ties in Washington a policy of shipping the unit and its essential equip-
ment together, some organizations continued to arrive without their
equipment, with the result that days, and on occasion even weeks,
might pass before it could be Yet, within two weeks of the
final collapse of Allied resistance on Java, American pursuit units were
making their presence felt in the defense of Australia’s outposts.
Especially depressing was the bomber situation. With twenty-six
B-I~’s,forty-three A-24’~’and one or two each of the A-20’s and
B-25’s on hand, only twelve heavy and twenty-seven dive bombers
were in commission on 18 MarcheZ4Neither the 7th nor the 19th
4 1 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.