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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“King”32 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 which was the 8th, had disembarked at Brisbane on 10 March, but only the 49th Group, which had come in early in February, was con- sidered ready for combat. The explanation for this and similar delays in preparing other units is readily revealed by a glance at the level of experience of the 49th’~1 0 2 pilots at the time of their arrival in the theater. Lt. Col. Paul B. Wurtsmith, its commanding officer, and his executive, Maj. Donald R. Hutchinson, were veteran pilots with 4,800 and 2,600 hours of pursuit time, respectively. Five other pilots had more than 600 hours, and nine were credited with about 15 hours, but the remaining eighty-nine pilots had no pursuit time at all.22As for the 35th, its more experienced pilots had been drafted for service with the provisional squadrons hurriedly organized for operation in the Netherlands East Indies, and such of them as had survived had been assigned to rest and recuperation in the hope that their battle experience might soon be put to use in the training of other pilots. Once again men struggled against the disadvantages that had beset their efforts in the Philippines and then in the Netherlands East Indies. They worked against time, enjoyed few of the benefits of previous preparation, and improvised as they went, in an attempt to meet the changing requirements of a highly fluid tactical situation. An organi- zation geared to the requirements of service and supply for operations in Java had to be readjusted to the tactical demands of a defense of Australia, Once more it was necessary to integrate activities with those of an ally; the Americans were dependent upon the Australians for communications and were forced to rely heavily upon them in all matters of administration; and once more good will on both sides was in itself insufficient to overcome all of the difficulties. The penalties of haste proved to be none the less because the haste was unavoidable. Although General Brett early in January had urged upon the authori- ties in Washington a policy of shipping the unit and its essential equip- ment together, some organizations continued to arrive without their equipment, with the result that days, and on occasion even weeks, might pass before it could be Yet, within two weeks of the final collapse of Allied resistance on Java, American pursuit units were making their presence felt in the defense of Australia’s outposts. Especially depressing was the bomber situation. With twenty-six B-I~’s,forty-three A-24’~’and one or two each of the A-20’s and B-25’s on hand, only twelve heavy and twenty-seven dive bombers were in commission on 18 MarcheZ4Neither the 7th nor the 19th 4 1 2
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