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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“United Press”36 pages
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1 of an early and vigorous offensive against Germany; (2) to concen- trate forces against Germany with acceptance of the possibility of losing all the Southwest Pacific; ( 3 ) to reinforce the Southwest Pacific and related areas to a point sufficient to maintain a defensive position while building up in the United Kingdom the forces required for assumption of the offensive at the earliest possible date.15 It was a difficult decision. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been prompt to recognize Germany as the most potent of our enemies and to shape their strategy accordingly. At the same time, the key impor- tance of Australia to plans for containing the Japanese had been recognized, and its loss, or even the loss of any considerable part of it, obviously might call into question the whole of the defensive strategy agreed upon for the Pacific. Australia herself was unequal to the task of providing her own defense. The best equipped and trained of her troops had not yet returned from the battlefields of the Middle East, and her air force in Australia on the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific possessed hardly more strength than did the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies. In the air especially, the burden of defending Australia would have to fall upon the Americans. At Darwin the RAAF could muster two understrength squadrons of Hudsons, one squadron of Wirraways, and two squadrons equipped with American A-24's. Even less well defended was Port Moresby with two reduced squadrons of Catalinas, one reduced squadron of Hudsons, and one squadron of Wirraways." Small in population and lacking adequate industrial facilities, Australia would be dependent largely on British and American production for the immediate equipment of her units with modern planes. Upon the Americans, too, would fall the main responsibility for defense of the island chain running back from Australia to provide and shield a line of communication with the United States, The Japanese at Rabaul were in position to move down the Solomons toward the New Hebrides and the Fijis with as much ease as now they advanced down the coast of New Guinea toward Port Moresby, and it was evident that air reinforcements would be required in addition to those already taking position along the South Pacific route." Once again the decision favored maintenance of a de- fensive position in the Pacific in the hope that an early offensive might be mounted against Germany. Of assistance in reaching this decision, no doubt, was the belief * For discussion of the problem, see Chap. 1 2 . 4'0
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