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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 5 …With the end of the war, Headquarters approved a plan for writing and publishing a seven…
  • p. 8 …The first hectic months after Pearl Harbor left little time in a military headquarters for consideration…
  • p. 9 …Department calling for the appointment by AAF Headquarters of a historian in accordance with the President…
  • p. 10 …After returning to Headquarters at the close of 1942, Colonel Williams found the pressure of a…
  • p. 11 …T h e first of those points, of course, was AAF Headquarters itself. Though the Army…
  • p. 12 …But, in developing a system of historical reporting from other headquarters, the “supporting docu- ments” received…
  • p. 13 …in the hurried atmosphere of a military headquarters, and it depended for its support upon men…
  • p. 14 …In most cases, however, the offer of professional assistance from AAF Headquarters was welcomed, though occasionally…
  • p. 15 …close of hostilities to bring into AAF Headquarters certain of the field per- sonnel for the…
  • p. 18 …Goss served as historian with the Fourth Air Force and was subsequently brought into AAF Headquarters…
  • p. 19 …Air Service Command, USSTAF, was assigned to Headquarters, USSTAF. Finally there remains something to be told…
  • p. 21 …Simpson of the Office of Air Force History, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Colonel Paul has…
  • p. 29 …JAPANESEINSTALLATIONS ON NORTHHEAD,KISKA,JULY1942 HEADQUARTERS,3 STH FIGHTERGROUP,PORT MORESBY,1942 HEADQUARTERS,3 gTH FIGHTERGROUP…
  • p. 45 …and his inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields, to-and over-the…
  • p. 53 …bulk of offensive air units to General Headquarters. The War Department resisted in turn every proposal…
  • p. 197 …The First Air Force, with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New York, was acting as a major…
  • p. 205 …The approved peacetime garrisons called for one heavy bombardment squadron and a group headquarters at Bermuda…
  • p. 209 …P-36’s in crates, and the headquarters squadron of the 28th Composite Group took up…
  • p. 210 …Defense Command, which forwarded the material to headquarters of the Western Defense Command at San Francisco…
  • p. 213 …Martin, was organized tactically into the 18th Bombardment Wing, with headquarters at Hickam Field, and the…
  • p. 214 …provided the separate squadrons with an air headquarters. Expansion of the Air Corps brought about a…
  • p. 221 …4th Composite Group, consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, the 3d Pursuit Squadron, and the…
  • p. 222 …AAF Headquarters felt that a striking force of heavy bombers would be a necessary part of…
  • p. 226 …during a series of conferences at AAF Headquarters in Washington. On 16 November the military air…
  • p. 230 …The watchers were instructed to transmit their observations by telephone or telegraph to headquarters of the…
  • p. 232 …which prevailed over the preference of general headquarters for a more northern and presumably more secure…
  • p. 252 …It would appear that the files of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, are also i n…
  • p. 254 …to General Headquarters, General Brereton states that he returned to his own headquarters a t Nielson…
  • p. 255 …George, chief of staff, V Interceptor Command, reported to headquarters “that there are 54 airplanes in…
  • p. 257 …The Summary of Activi- ties for Headquarters, Far East Air Force, notes: “11:56 General Brereton…
  • p. 268 …At I I I 5 , inter- ceptor headquarters received specific warning of enemy aircraft approaching from…
  • p. 270 …with a tele- phone line to operations headquarters. Until the Del Monte base could be greatly…
  • p. 272 …O n another occasion, 2 7th Group headquarters was falsely informed by telephone that its A…
  • p. 275 …two PBY’s to establish a new headquarters in Au~tralia.~’By +he 29th of December…
  • p. 281 …mission.” lo* General Brereton established a temporary headquarters at Darwin. Though the aim of all operations…
  • p. 288 …the air planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the…
  • p. 308 …General Headquarters was of recent origin, but the desirability of such a staff in the event…
  • p. 310 …both unit and individual training.88 General Headquarters’ responsibility for air force training was limited to…
  • p. 311 …WPD’s judgment that relations between General Headquarters and the Army Air Forces were “in- definite…
  • p. 312 …Gates.lo7 General Headquarters was not consulted until 5 February, but Gen- eral McNair had long…
  • p. 315 …In reality the influence of AAF Headquarters on the actual conduct of the war went far…
  • p. 344 …The director of Air Defense at AAF Headquarters concurred in every detail with the findings and…
  • p. 346 …With its headquarters a t San Francisco, the command included an extensive area of nine western…
  • p. 378 …The headquarters was established a t the main base a t Accra on 8 October 1941…
  • p. 400 …Here, in January 1942, the headquarters of the newly activated North Atlantic Sector of the Ferrying…
  • p. 405 …into the bases.‘38 Army Air Forces Headquarters, the Ferrying Command, and other interested AAF agencies…
  • p. 425 …was to be maintained between all major headquarters, logistical facilities would be shared, and local commanders…
  • p. 426 …O n 18 January, he located his headquarters at Lembang, ten miles north of Bandoeng in…
  • p. 434 …the United States and it was the headquarters of USAFIA, whose responsibility in January became chiefly…
  • p. 435 …the 2 I st Air Flotilla and headquarters detach- ments-moved to Davao during the first…
  • p. 442 …officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington throughout January. Australian and Dutch forces were…
  • p. 445 …organization, but co-ordination between its own headquarters and the Dutch interceptor control remained imperfect. T…
  • p. 454 …In Java, General Wavell closed his personal headquarters on 2 5 Feb- ruary, at which time…
  • p. 462 …Final Efforts in the Philippines When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra- lia…
  • p. 482 …He proposed the establishment of air headquarters in each defensive area, prepared to accept and operate…
  • p. 486 …AAF Headquarters had been prompt to recognize the need for properly equipped photographic squadrons, and shortly…
  • p. 491 …In fact, A-3 of AAF Headquarters already had prepared a squadron, the 68th, which was…
  • p. 517 …Emmons, commanding the Hawaiian Depart- ment, appealed to AAF Headquarters for additional planes, and these were…
  • p. 546 HEADQUARTERS, 3STH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
  • p. 547 HEADQUARTERS, 35TH FIGHTER GROUP, PORT MORESBY, 1942
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
of an early and vigorous offensive against Germany; (2) to concen-
trate forces against Germany with acceptance of the possibility of
losing all the Southwest Pacific; ( 3 ) to reinforce the Southwest Pacific
and related areas to a point sufficient to maintain a defensive position
while building up in the United Kingdom the forces required for
assumption of the offensive at the earliest possible date.15
It was a difficult decision. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been
prompt to recognize Germany as the most potent of our enemies and
to shape their strategy accordingly. At the same time, the key impor-
tance of Australia to plans for containing the Japanese had been
recognized, and its loss, or even the loss of any considerable part of
it, obviously might call into question the whole of the defensive
strategy agreed upon for the Pacific. Australia herself was unequal to
the task of providing her own defense. The best equipped and trained
of her troops had not yet returned from the battlefields of the Middle
East, and her air force in Australia on the outbreak of hostilities in
the Pacific possessed hardly more strength than did the Dutch in the
Netherlands East Indies. In the air especially, the burden of defending
Australia would have to fall upon the Americans. At Darwin the
RAAF could muster two understrength squadrons of Hudsons, one
squadron of Wirraways, and two squadrons equipped with American
A-24's. Even less well defended was Port Moresby with two reduced
squadrons of Catalinas, one reduced squadron of Hudsons, and one
squadron of Wirraways." Small in population and lacking adequate
industrial facilities, Australia would be dependent largely on British
and American production for the immediate equipment of her units
with modern planes. Upon the Americans, too, would fall the main
responsibility for defense of the island chain running back from
Australia to provide and shield a line of communication with the
United States, The Japanese at Rabaul were in position to move down
the Solomons toward the New Hebrides and the Fijis with as much
ease as now they advanced down the coast of New Guinea toward
Port Moresby, and it was evident that air reinforcements would be
required in addition to those already taking position along the South
Pacific route." Once again the decision favored maintenance of a de-
fensive position in the Pacific in the hope that an early offensive might
be mounted against Germany.
Of assistance in reaching this decision, no doubt, was the belief
* For discussion of the problem, see Chap. 1 2 .
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