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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planes. From Darwin the party was flown inland to entrain for Mel-
bourne.
Air Order of Battle in Australia
The prospect General MacArthur faced in Australia was none too
heartening. Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies had
placed enemy bombers within easy range of northwestern Australia,
where Darwin had been under recurrent attack for almost a month.
The occupation of Rabaul in January had been followed by air
attacks on Australian posts along the upper coast of eastern New
Guinea, and there on the night of 7/8 March Japanese landing parties
had moved ashore to occupy Lae and Salamaua on the Huon Gulf.
This move brought the enemy within 2 0 0 miles by air of Port
Moresby, chief Australian outpost in New Guinea, which had experi-
enced its first air attack early in February and would soon be the
victim of repeated raids staged through Lae and Salamaua. Fortu-
nately, the land approaches to Port Moresby were guarded by well-
nigh impenetrable jungles and the alpine reaches of the Owen Stanley
Mountains. Even so, when the enemy infantry pushed inland toward
the Australian mining center of Wau, 150miles above Port Moresby,
some saw in the move a step toward Port Moresby itself. Allied intel-
ligence dismissed the idea, but no one discounted the serious threat
of an amphibious assault designed to give the Japanese complete con-
trol of New Guinea.
A conquest of New Guinea would have removed the last land
barrier guarding the northern approaches to Australia. Though the
Japanese plan of war had not included an invasion of Australia,'*
Allied planners now were forced to accept such an eventuality as not
only possible but even perhaps probable. Early in March, the Austra-
lian chiefs of staff concluded that an attempt on Port Moresby might
be expected before the end of the month and an effort to occupy
Darwin early in April.13 In Washington one, though not all, of the
advisory committees of the Combined Chiefs of Staff felt that the
enemy might attempt a t least the occupation of such points on
the mainland as Darwin, Wyndham, and perhaps Town~ville.'~And so
once again, as so frequently during that winter and spring, the ques-
tion of a reallocation of forces had come under consideration. As
stated by the joint planners, there were three choices: ( I ) to send
strong reinforcements to the Pacific at the cost of sacrificing the hope
408

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