“Roosevelt”53 pages
- p. 5 …Imprint
N March 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to the
Director of the Bureau of…
- p. 138 …1939-4I
N 28 January 1938 President Roosevelt declared our national
defenses inadequate in the face…
- p. 141 …changed our requirements
for defensive aviation,” President Roosevelt strongly urged that $300,-
ooo,ooo be appropriated…
- p. 153 …When President Roosevelt initiated the move toward re-
I 16
- p. 160 …T h e first step was made public on 3 September 1940 when President
Roosevelt revealed…
- p. 165 …These sentiments were expressed by President Roosevelt in a radio
address on 3 September: “This Nation…
- p. 169 …In an address to Congress on 6 January 1941, President
Roosevelt suggested the means; 9 5…
- p. 170 …O n 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt requested the secretaries of
W a r and the…
- p. 171 …The British had prepared, a t the instigation of President Roosevelt,
an estimate of munitions requirements…
- p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at
sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
- p. 174 …cent; other
nations, 10 per cent.'"
President Roosevelt, anxious that as many planes as possible be…
- p. 185 …President Roosevelt’s request for the report had been
motivated wholly by considerations of logistics. But…
- p. 199 …On 5 July 1941
President Roosevelt, in oral orders to the Army Chief of Staff and…
- p. 220 …and it carried a threat which President Roosevelt
described in terms of the greatest danger faced…
- p. 258 …conflict between Japan and the
U.S. Roosevelt attempt curve our independence stop we all know…
- p. 273 …President Roosevelt specifically directed that reinforcements
should be sent there with all speed, and MacArthur was…
- p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs
of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
- p. 287 …evening, the British
party met with President Roosevelt and his military and civilian
advisers a t…
- p. 297 …O n 3 January President Roosevelt sent Mr. Stimson a list of muni-
tions, with a…
- p. 301 …In his address to
the Congress on 6 January, President Roosevelt promised that “we
shall not…
- p. 302 …Ultimate decisions on major
military policies were taken by President Roosevelt, as Commander
in Chief of…
- p. 304 …Leahy as personal chief of staff to President
Roosevelt in place of Admiral Stark.'* It was…
- p. 322 …given to the nation by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in a radio address on 9 D e…
- p. 331 …At the end of January, President Roosevelt
advised the President of Venezuela that, in deference to…
- p. 332 …During the course of a fireside report to the nation delivered by
President Roosevelt on 2…
- p. 352 …Secretary Stimson
reported to President Roosevelt his conviction that the planes from
even one carrier could…
- p. 366 …raised objections
which seemed convincing.8 President Roosevelt decided to adopt the
more modest proposal of…
- p. 370 …Elliott Roosevelt during the
summer on an aerial survey of the east coast of Greenland in…
- p. 400 …Elliott Roosevelt and others failed
to locate a suitable site for an airdrome.120A satisfactory site…
- p. 409 …mobilizing the resources of the airlines, President
Roosevelt had signed an executive order on 13 December…
- p. 465 …for effective
resistance in the Philippines, President Roosevelt had decided early in
February that the general…
- p. 480 …the basis of a proposal by President Roosevelt: there would
be a separate Southwest Pacific Area…
- p. 499 …Apparently
President Roosevelt himself played a role in initiating the expedition,
although it is not possible…
- p. 553 …Lauchlin Currie had gone to
China as economic adviser to President Roosevelt for study of her…
- p. 630 …in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered
on 5 March, in which the Prime…
- p. 632 …plan was approved in principle by President Roosevelt, and on
8 April General Marshall and Harry…
- p. 633 …message of 1 7 April, in-
formed Roosevelt of his approval of the design; his sole…
- p. 635 …A fortnight later, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff were alarmed by a query from Roosevelt as…
- p. 640 …in Norway-and they understood that President Roosevelt’s
anxiety to get U.S. troops into…
- p. 641 …On 8 July the Prime
Minister informed Roosevelt that conditions favorable to SLEDGE-
HAMMER would probably…
- p. 642 …on the ~ 4 t h . ~ ‘Ap-
parently Roosevelt gave his tentative approval in a telephone conver…
- p. 753 …This book shows the
close relations between Roosevelt and
the Committee T o Defend America by…
- p. 755 …Address by President Roosevelt at
Washington, 27 Oct. 1941, in Peace and
War, pp. 767-72…
- p. 756 …Ltr., Roosevelt to Stimson, 18
Sept. 1941,in WP I-General.
I I I . Release of…
- p. 774 …Memo for Roosevelt from Stim-
son, 14 Mar. 1942.
163. lbid.
164. History, Sixth Air Force…
- p. 776 …Elliott Roosevelt,
zIst Recon. Sq. to TAG, 8 Sept. 1941;
memo for Col. Olds from Capt…
- p. 779 …Elliott
Roosevelt to TAG, 6 July 1941; Atlantic
Bridge, pp. 27-29.
117. Ltr., Sec. of…
- p. 780 …Elliott Roosevelt to T A G , 3 Aug. 1941
(Report # 3 ) ; ltr., Capt. Elliott Roosevelt
to…
- p. 782 …Memo for S / W from President
Roosevelt, 6 May 1942, in ATC 321.
199. On the…
- p. 790 …Mills to TAG, Mac-
Arthur for Roosevelt, 11 Feb. 1942; msg.
#5, Australia to Marshall, 2…
- p. 802 …President Roosevelt had approved
the induction as early as 18 December
1941, contingent upon approval of…
- p. 857 …See also Coolidge;
Harding; Roosevelt; Wilson.
Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment…
- p. 858 …Erwin, 330, 339-41, 512
Roosevelt, Capt. Elliott, 3 18, 344
Roosevelt, Pres. F.D., 101…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
bat were cherished for transport purposes. For inter-island air trans-
port, principal reliance was placed on two Navy PBY’s and a motley
collection of craft-“a Duck, a Bellanca, and a Fairchild,” two Beech-
craft, a Waco, and two decrepit P-35’s-which had been dubbed the
“Bamboo Fleet.” But one by one these transports, like the combat
planes, were lost to enemy action, to accident, or simply to wear and
tear and the necessity of using for purposes of evacuation any plane
that could fly to Australia. The Wac0 was shot down with loss of
all its passengers near Del Monte; the Duck was forced down and
destroyed by the enemy, as also were both of the P-35’s; by the time
of Bataan’s fall in April, only the Bellanca was left. Flown by Maj.
William R. Bradford, it made its last flight from Mindanao with a
cargo of quinine for relief of the garrison on Corregidor, where it
crashed in attempting a take-off for yet another mission of relief.’
If the Americans on Bataan and Corregidor symbolized a will to
resist the Japanese aggression at all cost, those on Mindanao repre-
sented a lingering hope that reinforcements could be gotten through.
Early in January, General MacArthur, who clung to the belief that
even with defeat on Luzon it might be possible to build up strong
forces in Mindanao preparatory to a reconquest of all the Philippines,
had directed that airfields be constructed with all haste throughout
the Philippine Islands. Available air base personnel were sent out to
enlist the aid of local leaders and to provide supervision for construc-
tion undertaken. As a result, by I March the Americans had a t least
seven all-weather-type fields capable of receiving any kind of aircraft
on Mindanao, four on Negros, three on Cebu, and one each on Panay
and Bohol. In addition, there were nine fields on Mindanao, two on
Negros, and one each on Panay and Leyte suitable for use by pursuit
aircraft, not to mention others recommended for use only in dry
weather or for an emergency landing.8 The most extensive effort, as
the above-given figures indicate, had been made on Mindanao, where
Maj. Ray T. Elsmore subsequently reported a total of forty-two fields
that had been completed between the opening of hostilities and I
April 1942. Del Monte itself had been expanded into a complex incor-
porating eight outlying fields, one of which had its operations control
in a tunnel driven sixty-five feet into a neighboring mountain side.
Another of the Del Monte satellites provided a 3,000-foot runway
leading into a tunnel capacious enough to receive and park five P-40’s
at a time, Other bases on the island offered facilities for distribution
406