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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E D E F E N S E O F A U S T R A L I A
immediately assembled and put into pera at ion.^ For all practical pur-
poses, therefore, the American air forces on Luzon continued to be
the remnant of the 24th Pursuit Group, which had survived the
enemy’s initial assault-a handful of planes and fifteen pilots, who all
too aptly came to be described as the Bataan Field Flying Detach-
ment. Brig. Gen. Harold H. George of the interceptor command
directed its varied operations, supervised the maintenance of its dwin-
dling number of planes, and attended to the training of personnel in
the elementary problems existent in the field; and as the planes one
by one were shot down or worn out, he selected the air and ground
personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters
already included many representatives of the 27th, 24th, and 19th
groups. There were problems of adjustment to unfamiliar assignments
as the pilot led his ground crew against some enemy strongpoint or
rallied soldiers trained primarily as mechanics to defend a bit of land
that for the moment was American, but there was nothing unfamiliar
about the odds to be f a ~ e d . ~
T h e missions undertaken by the American pilots from Bataan fields
were described by General George as “the hardest and the most
dangerous.” T h e primary task was that of reconnaissance, and of
occasional patrol of the forward areas. Important, too, was the
attempted defense of our own area against enemy attack. N o w and
again it proved possible to strafe enemy communications, and on one
occasion in February even to mount a mission against Nichols and
Nielson fields by seven P-401s, which in addition to strafing dropped
fragmentation bombs. Filipino agents later reported loss to the enemy
of fourteen planes destroyed on the ground and the killing of many
Japanese. Once again, on 2 March, four P-qO’S, equipped with an
attachment for a goo-lb. bomb designed by Warrant Officer Jack E.
Bay, were led by Capt. William E. Dyess, Jr., in an attack on ship-
ping in Subic Bay. Although one P-40 was shot down and the remain-
ing three crashed on landing, apparently two transports had been sunk
and other small boats damaged.6 As the Japanese blockade tightened,
even P-40’s were pressed into service as transport planes. In addition
to an occasional mission for the transportation of medical supplies
from Mindanao to Bataan, they dropped supplies to isolated units on
the ground and sometimes carried passengers crowded into the bag-
gage compartment. As malnutrition, dysentery, and malaria wore
down the American soldiers, a few aircraft that were useless for com-
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