The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
His air force having been defeated at the very outset, his army there-
after was besieged on Bataan and Corregidor while the Japanese swept
on to effect the virtually complete isolation of all the Philippines.
Except for the occupation of Davao, Mindanao was left for over
three months to American troops who labored heroically to extend
and improve the facilities about Del Monte in anticipation of hoped-
for reinforcements. But their fate, like that of the men on Bataan,
was sealed hundreds of miles to the south-at Singapore, on Java, and
in t-he Bismarcks.
Final Efforts in the Philippines
When General Brereton’s headquarters had been moved to Austra-
lia late in December, it was hoped that the partial withdrawal of our
air units would be only temporary, and that provision could be made
for an increasing flow of materials from the Australian base to the
Philippines. Indeed, the prompt decision to send bombers to the Neth-
erlands East Indies had been dictated in large part by the necessity to
provide all possible protection for the reinforcements on which the
Philippines depended. But the enemy had moved too fast, and soon
there was left only the hope that blockade runners might prolong the
resistance on Bataan. Vigorous attempts to provide aid by such means
-attempts which included requesting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
to assist in a plan to run small boats from the China coast to Luzon-
were made by American civilian and military authorities. Again, how-
ever, hopes were to be replaced by disappointment. Inevitably there
were delays in effecting the necessary arrangements in Australia,
where alone circumstances proved in any way favorable, and of the
ships dispatched only three got through to the Philippines. At least
fifteen others which hazarded the dangerous run were either sunk or
captured. Submarines got through and heavy bombers flew in needed
supplies and ammunition to Del Monte for subsequent transfer to
Bataan, but the numbers available were as limited as was their capacity
to carry freight.z
The prompt severance of the projected ferry route by way of Koe-
pang, Kendari, and Tarakan left our pursuit forces on Luzon wholly
dependent upon water shipment for reinforcement, with the result
that only three P-40’s reached the Philippines through the long weeks
preceding the fall of Corregidor in May. These had been shipped in
crates from Australia to Mindanao, where early in March they were
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