“United Press”36 pages
- p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8
LONDON
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada
Copyright 1948 by…
- p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary
judgment of the importance of this…
- p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani-
zation and, by default, leadership…
- p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing
for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
- p. 61 …It held that
there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
- p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures,
and Howell’s group…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States
and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
- p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could
be concentrated on either coast…
- p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval
air units, while the army attempted to…
- p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train-
ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
- p. 164 …A m y air units in the
Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
- p. 176 …no military alliances
were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans
only…
- p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy
bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
- p. 285 …From 1938 the United
States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
- p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and
lmmediate Deployment
On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
- p. 289 …ground units sent
in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major
invasion of…
- p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States.
Capture of…
- p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them-
selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
- p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart-
ment again pressed for an answer…
- p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle
East Air Force and later as…
- p. 430 …Attempts had been
made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United
States, but…
- p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no
opportunity to get set. The…
- p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters
already included many representatives of the…
- p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the
Netherlands East Indies, he was…
- p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved
that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed
trucks…
- p. 563 …Grady arrived from the
United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with
reference to…
- p. 564 …TO C H I N A
graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to
make high…
- p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became
almost a t once…
- p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily
against…
- p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air
units initially based there were to…
- p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United
Kingdom several months…
- p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with
its own under a plan eventually…
- p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was
(Patrick, United States in the Air, pp.
190-91.)
38. Charges of…
- p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941.
9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a.
92…
- p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45
Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
C H A P T E R 11
* * * * * * * * * * *
T H E DEFENSE OF
AUSTRALIA
N THE rapid southward thrust which by the opening days of
March 1942 had placed Japanese forces in control of the Malay
I Peninsula, of the Netherlands East Indies, and of the BismarckArchipelago, and which had brought them to the very doors of
Australia, the enemy had given effective demonstration of the type
of amphibious warfare that until the B-29’s began full-scale operations
would dominate the struggle in the Pacific. Operating under a plan
to throw overwhelming force against strategic points, Japanese land-
ing parties had moved forward in leaps of several hundred miles a t
a time, preceded by submarine and flying boat reconnaissance and by
light air raids mounted from the nearest land bases, and then by
heavier bombing attacks with escort provided as the occasion required
by carrier-borne or land-based fighters. An immediate objective of
the landing parties, while overcoming such local opposition as might
be met, was seizure of an airfield on which a prompt basing of fighters
for defense of the invading forces was merely preliminary to the
bringing in of bombers in preparation for the next move forward.
Within a week of the landing, the Japanese usually had repaired or
extended the facilities with the aid of local labor to permit their use
by two-engine bombers.’
T h e enemy’s tactics, which included the device of passing by cer-
tain points of resistance in accordance with a plan to reduce them at
leisure or merely to leave them to the ultimate penalties of isolation
and blockade, resembled those that were to be employed later by
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur in their offensives of 1943
and 1944. Indeed, General MacArthur had been the war’s first victim
of a type of warfare he subsequently would make peculiarly his own.
403