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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
C H A P T E R 11
* * * * * * * * * * *
T H E DEFENSE OF
AUSTRALIA
N THE rapid southward thrust which by the opening days of
March 1942 had placed Japanese forces in control of the Malay
I Peninsula, of the Netherlands East Indies, and of the BismarckArchipelago, and which had brought them to the very doors of
Australia, the enemy had given effective demonstration of the type
of amphibious warfare that until the B-29’s began full-scale operations
would dominate the struggle in the Pacific. Operating under a plan
to throw overwhelming force against strategic points, Japanese land-
ing parties had moved forward in leaps of several hundred miles a t
a time, preceded by submarine and flying boat reconnaissance and by
light air raids mounted from the nearest land bases, and then by
heavier bombing attacks with escort provided as the occasion required
by carrier-borne or land-based fighters. An immediate objective of
the landing parties, while overcoming such local opposition as might
be met, was seizure of an airfield on which a prompt basing of fighters
for defense of the invading forces was merely preliminary to the
bringing in of bombers in preparation for the next move forward.
Within a week of the landing, the Japanese usually had repaired or
extended the facilities with the aid of local labor to permit their use
by two-engine bombers.’
T h e enemy’s tactics, which included the device of passing by cer-
tain points of resistance in accordance with a plan to reduce them at
leisure or merely to leave them to the ultimate penalties of isolation
and blockade, resembled those that were to be employed later by
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur in their offensives of 1943
and 1944. Indeed, General MacArthur had been the war’s first victim
of a type of warfare he subsequently would make peculiarly his own.
403

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.