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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 103 …hour from the Boe- ing plant in Seattle to Dayton-a distance of 2,100 miles…
  • p. 322 …on the preceding night “store windows in Seattle which did not dim were smashed by irate…
  • p. 330 …aircraft plants as those of Boeing in Seattle, Douglas and Lockheed in Los Angeles, and Consolidated…
  • p. 335 …submarine- launched aircraft were subsequently used over Seattle.82 A careful study of the evidence suggests…
  • p. 342 …to guard the 1,200 miles from Seattle to San Diego.'" This * See above, pp. 153…
  • p. 350 …advance warning of aircraft approaching the vital Seattle-Bremerton region from across the international border. This…
  • p. 531 …a plane from a submarine to scout Seattle harbor, while another plane checked on Dutch Harbor…
  • p. 858 …Attack Development Unit, Force, 420 Sea Lion, 218 550-51 602 Seattle, 285, 298, 466 783
C H A P T E R 11
* * * * * * * * * * *
T H E DEFENSE OF
AUSTRALIA
N THE rapid southward thrust which by the opening days of
March 1942 had placed Japanese forces in control of the Malay
I Peninsula, of the Netherlands East Indies, and of the BismarckArchipelago, and which had brought them to the very doors of
Australia, the enemy had given effective demonstration of the type
of amphibious warfare that until the B-29’s began full-scale operations
would dominate the struggle in the Pacific. Operating under a plan
to throw overwhelming force against strategic points, Japanese land-
ing parties had moved forward in leaps of several hundred miles a t
a time, preceded by submarine and flying boat reconnaissance and by
light air raids mounted from the nearest land bases, and then by
heavier bombing attacks with escort provided as the occasion required
by carrier-borne or land-based fighters. An immediate objective of
the landing parties, while overcoming such local opposition as might
be met, was seizure of an airfield on which a prompt basing of fighters
for defense of the invading forces was merely preliminary to the
bringing in of bombers in preparation for the next move forward.
Within a week of the landing, the Japanese usually had repaired or
extended the facilities with the aid of local labor to permit their use
by two-engine bombers.’
T h e enemy’s tactics, which included the device of passing by cer-
tain points of resistance in accordance with a plan to reduce them at
leisure or merely to leave them to the ultimate penalties of isolation
and blockade, resembled those that were to be employed later by
Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur in their offensives of 1943
and 1944. Indeed, General MacArthur had been the war’s first victim
of a type of warfare he subsequently would make peculiarly his own.
403

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.