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This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.
“Cairo”26 pages
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S transports, and two unidentified ships. T h e crews claimed twenty- three enemy aircraft shot down, but a t the same time at least thirty- eight of our own bombers were lost-six in combat, six by accident, and twenty-six destroyed on the ground.111 Valuable lessons had been learned or re-emphasized. Perhaps the chief of these was the necessity to provide, particularly for heavy bombers, adequate air defense of bases. T h e importance of camou- flage, of revetments, and of the use of such devices of deception and cover as the dummy plane had received new emphasis. It was evident, however, that none of these would be enough in the absence of pro- vision for adequate aircraft warning, antiaircraft defenses, and strong interceptor forces. It also had been found that the LB-30 was vulner- able to pursuit attack and that its performance above 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet was unsatisfactory; that the B- I 7 needed more range and armament, that its oxygen system possessed faults, and that it required a self-sealing bomb bay tank.'" Generally, however, the B-17 crews praised their plane, particularly for its ruggedness in carrying them through and getting them back, and few of them perhaps would have denied that there was a certain aptness in a description broadcast from Tokyo which identified the big bomber as a "four engine pursuit ship, used for all purposes." Though the A-24 had been inadequately tested, it gave promise of effective use against shipping targets. Its principal weaknesses, a short range and insufficient armament, would require the establishment of good advance bases and provision of strong pursuit e s c ~ r t . " ~T h e P-40 had given a good account of itself-it could outdive the Japanese fighters, was faster in level flight, and was better armored. But the enemy plane seemed to have more range, could outclimb the P-40, and was more maneuverable. For the American pilot to risk a dogfight was to flirt with suicide.'15 Indeed, by no means least among the lessons learned was a new respect for the foe. It could be argued perhaps that it would have been a wiser course to avoid the piecemeal commitment of our aircraft in the Netherlands East Indies, and to have held them in Australia until a respectable striking force had been built up and made ready for operation from reasonably well-established bases there. But such an argument would ignore important considerations of morale which had a bearing, among other things, on the Allied hope of rallying within Asia itself resistance to Japanese aggression. T h e Australians, British, and Dutch 40'
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