Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Hudsons, and had killed a t least forty-five Dutch civilians and twenty
American airmen.'og
So ended, in still another terrifying demonstration of the cost to
those who allow control of the air to pass to their enemies, the air
phase of the Java campaign.
For the American airmen, it had been a bitter and frustrating ex-
perience. T h e pursuit unit, which carried a major share of the respon-
sibility for defense of the island, rarely had more than twenty P-40's
in commission at a time. Of some I 2 0 pursuit aircraft forwarded from
Australia during January and February, only thirty-six reached their
destination. Against a numerically superior and skillful enemy, the
pursuit pilots shot down Japanese planes in excess perhaps of their
own total numbers-claims were made for thirty-eight kills-but the
battle ended with the American unit having lost literally all of its
planes. Creditable as was the effort, pilots not previously seasoned in
the Philippines a t times showed their inexperience and a lack of ade-
quate training.'"
The initial trial of American heavy bombardment had proved disap-
pointing, though it was difficult to argue that the test had been a fair
one. The planes had been built for operation from fixed and well-
equipped installations, and while emphasis had been laid on precision
bombardment in the training of crews, standard practice called for
pattern bombing by relatively large formations against targets of the
sort most frequently bombed in the Netherlands East Indies. The
bombers originally withdrawn from the Philippines had been rein-
forced by a t least thirty-seven B-17's and twelve LB-~o's,but some of
these came late and rarely had there been more than fifteen of the
big planes in commission at a time. Targets had been plentiful, in fact
too plentiful, and the bomber command had been forced repeatedly
to divide its attention, not always in accordance with its own choice,
between varied and scattered objectives. Unfavorable weather,
mechanical failures attributable to inadequate maintenance, the sur-
prising effectiveness of enemy air defenses, the ineffectiveness of
Allied air defenses, and sheer weariness-all took their toll. During
January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi-
mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a total of over 300 sorties,
the great majority of them against shipping targets. Of the bombers
participating, more than 40 per cent failed to reach their targets.
Those getting through claimed the sinking of one destroyer, eight
400

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.