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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 303 …of Naval Opera- tions; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Gen. George…
  • p. 316 …So far as the Navy is concerned, Admiral King, as you know, is not only Chief…
  • p. 493 …Admiral King believed that the mines offered a tempting bait to the Japanese who were currently…
  • p. 526 …Hence Admiral King placed a bid for suffi- 461
  • p. 527 …t this stage of the war Admiral King had accepted the belief that his carrier planes…
  • p. 538 …plan by 2 9 June, when Admiral King submitted to the Joint Chiefs a proposal that…
  • p. 607 …type * O n 5 March 1942, Admiral King wrote to General Arnold as follows: “The experience…
  • p. 608 …s.’l A formal request by Admiral King to the Chief of the Army Air Forces…
  • p. 609 …In a letter of 9 March 1942 to Admiral King, he proposed “the estab- lishment of…
  • p. 614 …In June, Admiral King expressed the official Navy position on this point with the utmost clarity…
  • p. 615 …In a memorandum to Admiral King, General McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, on 26 May outlined…
  • p. 616 …viewed as a temporary deta~hment.?~ Admiral King’s reaction to these cautious proposals was expressed…
  • p. 618 …the same words as used by Admiral King a month earlier: the answer to the antisubmarine…
  • p. 621 …On 14 September, General Marshall wrote to Admiral King: “Experience with the First Bomber Command in…
  • p. 622 …T o General Marshall’s proposal of 14 September, Admiral King had replied that, although he…
  • p. 641 …54 A week later General Marshall, Admiral King, Harry Hopkins, and a small staff flew to…
  • p. 645 …that scheduled to operate from the United King- dom. Dry topic or no, organization must figure…
  • p. 684 …the principal air task in the United King- dom had long been conceived as strategic bombardment…
  • p. 707 …establishment of base depots in the United King- dom became the basis of action in January…
  • p. 724 …Implicit in all of the arrangements being made in the United King- dom was the belief…
  • p. 788 …Force, Pt. I ; Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, First Official Report to the Secretary of the…
  • p. 793 …Memo for Adm, King from C/S, 17 Mar. 1 % ~ . 34. JPS 2I/j/D, 7…
  • p. 795 …4 Aug. 1942. 108. Zbid. 109. Adm. King’s Report on Battle of Midway, incl. in…
  • p. 797 …306, 29 June 1942; memos for Adm. King from Mar- shall, 26 June 1942, and for…
  • p. 802 …1942; CM-IN-0629, Chung- king to AGWAR, # # z , 3 Apr. 1942; memo for Gen. Arnold…
  • p. 805 …Ltr., Arnold to King, 2 5 Feb. 1942. certain evidence from all Allied and enemy sources…
  • p. 806 …Memo for King from McNarney, 26 May 1942. 7 1 . Ltr., King to Marshall, 10 June…
  • p. 807 …Ltr., Marshall to King, 14 Sept. 1942, TAB XIVA, in Bowles report; memo for C G…
  • p. 808 …to notes from Mar- shall and Adm. King). 3 2 . A I c m o for…
  • p. 814 …Forces to the United King- dom, App. A, 19 Aug. 1942. 50. Ltr., Col. H.L…
  • p. 851 …C.E., 48-50 Killin, Pfc, 219 Kilner Board, 1 2 0 Kimbolton, 63 I King…
  • p. 854 …in Chief, 515, 5 2 2 , 544. (see also King); controversy over air power vs. battleship…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Hudsons, and had killed a t least forty-five Dutch civilians and twenty
American airmen.'og
So ended, in still another terrifying demonstration of the cost to
those who allow control of the air to pass to their enemies, the air
phase of the Java campaign.
For the American airmen, it had been a bitter and frustrating ex-
perience. T h e pursuit unit, which carried a major share of the respon-
sibility for defense of the island, rarely had more than twenty P-40's
in commission at a time. Of some I 2 0 pursuit aircraft forwarded from
Australia during January and February, only thirty-six reached their
destination. Against a numerically superior and skillful enemy, the
pursuit pilots shot down Japanese planes in excess perhaps of their
own total numbers-claims were made for thirty-eight kills-but the
battle ended with the American unit having lost literally all of its
planes. Creditable as was the effort, pilots not previously seasoned in
the Philippines a t times showed their inexperience and a lack of ade-
quate training.'"
The initial trial of American heavy bombardment had proved disap-
pointing, though it was difficult to argue that the test had been a fair
one. The planes had been built for operation from fixed and well-
equipped installations, and while emphasis had been laid on precision
bombardment in the training of crews, standard practice called for
pattern bombing by relatively large formations against targets of the
sort most frequently bombed in the Netherlands East Indies. The
bombers originally withdrawn from the Philippines had been rein-
forced by a t least thirty-seven B-17's and twelve LB-~o's,but some of
these came late and rarely had there been more than fifteen of the
big planes in commission at a time. Targets had been plentiful, in fact
too plentiful, and the bomber command had been forced repeatedly
to divide its attention, not always in accordance with its own choice,
between varied and scattered objectives. Unfavorable weather,
mechanical failures attributable to inadequate maintenance, the sur-
prising effectiveness of enemy air defenses, the ineffectiveness of
Allied air defenses, and sheer weariness-all took their toll. During
January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi-
mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a total of over 300 sorties,
the great majority of them against shipping targets. Of the bombers
participating, more than 40 per cent failed to reach their targets.
Those getting through claimed the sinking of one destroyer, eight
400

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