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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Hudsons, and had killed a t least forty-five Dutch civilians and twenty
American airmen.'og
So ended, in still another terrifying demonstration of the cost to
those who allow control of the air to pass to their enemies, the air
phase of the Java campaign.
For the American airmen, it had been a bitter and frustrating ex-
perience. T h e pursuit unit, which carried a major share of the respon-
sibility for defense of the island, rarely had more than twenty P-40's
in commission at a time. Of some I 2 0 pursuit aircraft forwarded from
Australia during January and February, only thirty-six reached their
destination. Against a numerically superior and skillful enemy, the
pursuit pilots shot down Japanese planes in excess perhaps of their
own total numbers-claims were made for thirty-eight kills-but the
battle ended with the American unit having lost literally all of its
planes. Creditable as was the effort, pilots not previously seasoned in
the Philippines a t times showed their inexperience and a lack of ade-
quate training.'"
The initial trial of American heavy bombardment had proved disap-
pointing, though it was difficult to argue that the test had been a fair
one. The planes had been built for operation from fixed and well-
equipped installations, and while emphasis had been laid on precision
bombardment in the training of crews, standard practice called for
pattern bombing by relatively large formations against targets of the
sort most frequently bombed in the Netherlands East Indies. The
bombers originally withdrawn from the Philippines had been rein-
forced by a t least thirty-seven B-17's and twelve LB-~o's,but some of
these came late and rarely had there been more than fifteen of the
big planes in commission at a time. Targets had been plentiful, in fact
too plentiful, and the bomber command had been forced repeatedly
to divide its attention, not always in accordance with its own choice,
between varied and scattered objectives. Unfavorable weather,
mechanical failures attributable to inadequate maintenance, the sur-
prising effectiveness of enemy air defenses, the ineffectiveness of
Allied air defenses, and sheer weariness-all took their toll. During
January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi-
mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a total of over 300 sorties,
the great majority of them against shipping targets. Of the bombers
participating, more than 40 per cent failed to reach their targets.
Those getting through claimed the sinking of one destroyer, eight
400

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