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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 370 …Reichers took a route by way of Cairo across central Africa, the South Atlantic, and up…
  • p. 371 …I 0,000 miles separated Miami from Cairo.23An airplane leaving southern Florida traveled 4,000…
  • p. 372 …of Africa and across central Africa to Cairo. Ferrying operations over the South Atlantic route had…
  • p. 375 …Takoradi following the completion of deliveries to Cairo, and for hauling critical items of supply east…
  • p. 378 …7 December the service was extended to Cairo and beyond.54 Before operations could begin, Pan…
  • p. 379 …Maxwell had been established at Cairo on I 3 September 1941, with responsibilities similar to those…
  • p. 380 …to the opening of a service to Cairo over the South Atlantic route. Two survey flights…
  • p. 381 …R Y I N G Washington for Cairo prior to 7 December, each carrying important military…
  • p. 382 …of the bombers departed Bolling Field for Cairo on 20 November. Unfortunately, on the trip across…
  • p. 385 …Lend-lease planes for Russia were flown through Cairo to Basra or to Tehran, where they…
  • p. 387 …for ferrying up the old Cape-to-Cairo airway. Although more exposed to attack, Takoradi and…
  • p. 388 …Tampa-Trinidad- Belem-Natal-Accra-Khartoum-Cairo-Habbaniya-Karachi.At Karachi the LB-3o’s under…
  • p. 390 …24 shuttle services to Great Britain and Cairo. The first step was to establish a ferrying…
  • p. 391 …parts stocked by the RAF a t Cairo, all spare parts had to be shipped from…
  • p. 395 …assembled and then ferried across Africa to Cairo. Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, the…
  • p. 407 …Harbor, first to Britain and later to Cairo, had been little more than courier services and…
  • p. 411 …from their normal operations between Washington and Cairo and sent to the Far East. A plan…
  • p. 412 …Kester-the pilot who had inaugurated the Washington- Cairo transport service in November-was lost off…
  • p. 413 …In February, Transcontinental & Western Air began operating a shuttle service from Washington to Cairo, using two…
  • p. 629 …5) MAGNET (Northern Ireland); (6) Task Force CAIRO (to Egypt).g On 2 7 January the…
  • p. 630 …one group of heavies set up for CAIRO was to go out only after the initial…
  • p. 778 …CM-IN, MA Cairo to M E I D 65. CM-IN, London (Brett) to Trip…
  • p. 779 …1942; CM- IN, Cairo (Fellen) to T A G (Adler for Arnold), 8754 Amseg, 3 Feb…
  • p. 786 …1942; msg. $762, Cairo to T A G , 4 Feb. IWZ; msg. #13, Brett to T…
  • p. 830 …BOLERO BR CAA C/AAF C/AC CAIRO C/AS C A T F CCRC CCS…
  • p. 844 …5 Cagayan (Mindanao), 219 Cagayan Valley, 208 Cairo, 3 1 ~ 2 1 , 325-26, 328-29…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
Hudsons, and had killed a t least forty-five Dutch civilians and twenty
American airmen.'og
So ended, in still another terrifying demonstration of the cost to
those who allow control of the air to pass to their enemies, the air
phase of the Java campaign.
For the American airmen, it had been a bitter and frustrating ex-
perience. T h e pursuit unit, which carried a major share of the respon-
sibility for defense of the island, rarely had more than twenty P-40's
in commission at a time. Of some I 2 0 pursuit aircraft forwarded from
Australia during January and February, only thirty-six reached their
destination. Against a numerically superior and skillful enemy, the
pursuit pilots shot down Japanese planes in excess perhaps of their
own total numbers-claims were made for thirty-eight kills-but the
battle ended with the American unit having lost literally all of its
planes. Creditable as was the effort, pilots not previously seasoned in
the Philippines a t times showed their inexperience and a lack of ade-
quate training.'"
The initial trial of American heavy bombardment had proved disap-
pointing, though it was difficult to argue that the test had been a fair
one. The planes had been built for operation from fixed and well-
equipped installations, and while emphasis had been laid on precision
bombardment in the training of crews, standard practice called for
pattern bombing by relatively large formations against targets of the
sort most frequently bombed in the Netherlands East Indies. The
bombers originally withdrawn from the Philippines had been rein-
forced by a t least thirty-seven B-17's and twelve LB-~o's,but some of
these came late and rarely had there been more than fifteen of the
big planes in commission at a time. Targets had been plentiful, in fact
too plentiful, and the bomber command had been forced repeatedly
to divide its attention, not always in accordance with its own choice,
between varied and scattered objectives. Unfavorable weather,
mechanical failures attributable to inadequate maintenance, the sur-
prising effectiveness of enemy air defenses, the ineffectiveness of
Allied air defenses, and sheer weariness-all took their toll. During
January and February the bomber command dispatched approxi-
mately sixty heavy bomber missions, for a total of over 300 sorties,
the great majority of them against shipping targets. Of the bombers
participating, more than 40 per cent failed to reach their targets.
Those getting through claimed the sinking of one destroyer, eight
400

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.