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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 12 …T h e term “first narrative,” bor- rowed from the RAF, was frequently used to describe…
  • p. 16 …history would constitute a lifetime assignment-the RAF’s history of World W a r I…
  • p. 47 …being made up of aircraft from the RAF’s Independent Force, the whole of the French…
  • p. 48 …early 1917.O n 6 June 1918the RAF’s Independent Force had been established with its…
  • p. 53 …Most radical was the independent air force, usually drawing heavily upon the RAF and its Air…
  • p. 114 …I when a British mission of retired RAF officers and others arrived in Japan to assist…
  • p. 127 …At Dunkirk the Luftwaff e momentarily yielded supremacy to the RAF, which was able to gain…
  • p. 128 …After French surrender on 2 2 June, only the RAF remained for the Luftwaffe to conquer…
  • p. 129 …T h e RAF and the Battle of Britain The German bombing of Britain in World…
  • p. 130 …The RAF retained its autonomy; but, even so, sentiment for many years, like that in the…
  • p. 131 …it was hoped that the badly ournumbered RAF would be able to hold off any German…
  • p. 132 …By the end of September the RAF had asserred its control of the air over rhe…
  • p. 133 …It will take no credit from the RAF’s outnumbered “few” to sug- gest that the…
  • p. 136 …Operations of the RAF after the fall of 1940 were as widely dis- persed as were…
  • p. 137 …on strategic bombardment, would find in the RAF a stout and under- standing ally. It is…
  • p. 171 …British requirements amounted to 49,385 planes, including first-line strength and wastage for the RAF…
  • p. 186 …with fresh data and a familiarity with RAF experience. Actual authorship of a military document is…
  • p. 290 …to prewar plans, was to join the RAF in the attack on Germany. This project was…
  • p. 338 …Fortunately, the RAF, magnificently served by such advisers as Robert Watson-Watt, rapidly went beyond the…
  • p. 341 …enjoyed through the co-operation of the RAF unusual opportunities to com- pare results with those…
  • p. 343 …United States military mission in London, the RAF offered the services of Robert Watson-Watt, Scientific…
  • p. 369 …The majority of the Hudsons were delivered a t Montreal to the RAF Ferry Com- mand…
  • p. 391 …of its production was required by the RAF to meet current operational commitments. The gasoline had…
  • p. 398 …an initial mission to participate with the RAF in the bombardment of Germany. Questions remained regarding…
  • p. 404 …air force personnel were concentrated at the RAF base a t Reykjavik, occupying facilities on the…
  • p. 553 …of models considered obsolescent for AAF and RAF needs, and cadres of American pilots and ground…
  • p. 555 …were considered obsolescent by the AAF and RAF) previously allocated to Sweden were released for the…
  • p. 556 …in addition to collaboration with a small RAF contingent in defense of Rangoon, he provided patrol…
  • p. 557 …Even when the enemy after his first experience sought to wipe out the RAF and A…
  • p. 565 …General Naiden’s survey indicated that the normal run should be between the RAF base a…
  • p. 566 …Unable to challenge seriously the enemy’s supremacy in the air, meager RAF and A V…
  • p. 568 …May, the bombers struck at Mingaladon, former RAF airdrome near Rangoon which the Japanese were using…
  • p. 570 …fensive efforts between the Tenth and the RAF, and on 1 5 April the War Department…
  • p. 571 …Accordingly, on 24 May the order committing the Tenth Air Force to operations under RAF supervision…
  • p. 609 …It also reflected the profound influence exerted by the RAF Coastal Command on AAF thinking. That…
  • p. 610 …Fleet Air Arm by creating a special RAF command, equipped and trained for sea search and…
  • p. 614 …control in terms comparable to those governing RAF Coastal Command. Almost from the beginning, the question…
  • p. 615 …it had been the experience of the RAF “that a purely defensive policy only leads to…
  • p. 619 …On the tactical side, valuable assistance was obtained from an experienced RAF crew which flew two…
  • p. 626 …bomber crews flying borrowed Bostons in an RAF routine sweep against enemy airfields." During the seven…
  • p. 628 …current allocation of heavy bombers to the RAF.6 N o immediate cut was contemplated; and…
  • p. 630 …was suggested that for the present the RAF would assume sole responsibility for the air offensive…
  • p. 633 …the conduct in co-operation with the RAF of an offensive against western Europe in 1942…
  • p. 634 …T o the Air Staff, as to RAF Bomber Command, the bomber offensive had figured as…
  • p. 635 …Now that the SLEDGEHAMMERJROUNDUP strategy had been accepted, the RAF wanted the United States to increase…
  • p. 636 …the British desire for reinforcement of the Middle East; the RAF Coastal Command’s request for…
  • p. 637 …I ) allocate to Great Britain for the RAF and Dominion air forces aircraft according to an…
  • p. 647 …TRIGGER, a plan to set up in America, with RAF aid, a model air defense sector…
  • p. 648 …important fea- tures were borrowed from the RAF. H e proposed to effect a sharp cleavage…
  • p. 649 …Because AAF bombers would have the special mission, in co-operation with the RAF, of attacking…
  • p. 653 …Chaney must provide for their operational control with- out recourse to the RAF. Chaney’s immediate…
  • p. 656 …forces and the RAF, provision must be made for two chains of command-that of the…
  • p. 657 …i.e., Eighth Air Force = RAF; VIII Bomber Command = RAF Bomber Command) ; and while it provided…
  • p. 659 …Under these conditions, relations with RAF Bomber Command were more important for the Eighth Air Force…
  • p. 660 …ning for the bomber offensive with the RAF. Daylight or Dark? As an argument in favor…
  • p. 661 …weapons are the Russian army and the RAF.” 1 5 5 It is significant that this…
  • p. 662 …Critics complained of the RAF’s failure to provide adequate close support for ground operations in…
  • p. 663 …Messages from that office cast doubts upon the results of the RAF bomber offensive and criticized…
  • p. 664 …When in 1941 the two air staffs began planning their combined attack on Germany, the RAF…
  • p. 665 …Even before the war, RAF preference had run to night tactics for strategic bombardment, an attitude…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
enemy planes appeared overhead, and in the middle of the afternoon
the Pecos also went down. Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from again.Io6
T h e evacuation of Java was already in full swing. Since 2 5 Febru-
ary all aircraft which possessed the necessary range had been pressed
into service for the evacuation of military personnel not required for
the operation of remaining aircraft. At Broome, on the northwestern
coast of Australia, an evacuation center was hastily organized under
the direction of Col. E. S. Perrin.lo7One by one the air bases in Java
were abandoned for demolition by Dutch authorities until on the
evening of I March Jogjakarta alone remained in Allied hands. T o
it had come the surviving personnel of the 17th Pursuit to be flown
out that night to Broome. O n the following night, 260 officers and
men still awaited evacuation and only five B-17’s and three LB-30’s
were available, but each LB-30 took off with thirty-five passengers
and each B-17 carried out thirty-one. As the last plane took off just
before midnight, the Japanese were only eighteen miles away, and
Dutch troops stood ready to explode their demolition charges.*”
T h e eight American bombers reached Broome early in the morning
of 3 A4arch. Broome had been a major port of entry for evacuees from
Java; and transport pilots were straining their endurance in an attempt
to ferry one load of refugees after another down the coast of western
Australia to Perth. In anticipation of an enemy attack (a Japanese
reconnaissance plane had been sighted during the night), all aircraft
had been warned to leave before 1000that morning. At just that hour
a crowded B-24 transport cleared the field. When it had climbed to
only three or four hundred feet, approximately a dozen Japanese
fighters swept in over the harbor. Their fire punctured the gas tanks
of the helpless B-24, which crashed into the sea, broke in two, and
all of its passengers except one enlisted man were drowned. Waiting
for take-off in the harbor were several Dutch flying boats already
loaded with evacuees, mostly Dutch women and children. Other ships
on the airfield stood ready for take-off or were the objects of hurried
preparations by their crews. T h e personnel on the field who reached
the cover of near-by scrub bush watched every plane on the field
explode or burn to the ground, and from the harbor came sounds of
the destruction wrought among the helpless seaplanes. T h e enemy
had destroyed twelve flying boats, two B - I ~ ’ s ,two B-24’~,and two
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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.