Documents / Document

The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
mantle on 2 2 February, however, three of them, carrying most of the
Army personnel, ten P-~o’s,and many motor vehicles, had been
directed to Burma rather than to Java in keeping with a decision
which had been reached by 17 F e b r ~ a r y . ’ ~The decision had been
dictated by considerations which apparently also brought into ques-
tion the destination of the Langley, with its deckload of thirty-two
fully assembled P-~o’s,and of another vessel, the Sea Witch,in whose
hold twenty-seven crated P-40’s had been stored. But on the day of
its sailing General Wave11 ordered the Langley to Java, and a similar
order was subsequently issued for the Sea Witch; for shortly after
sailing, the Langley and, sometime later, the Sea Witch parted com-
pany with the other ships to set a course for Tjilatjap on southern
Java.98 The Sea Witch got through five days later, but the Langley
went down on 2 7 February-and none of the P-40’s they carried sur-
vived to fight the Japanese.”
Meanwhile, the I 7th Pursuit Squadron (Prov.) approached the
end of its brief and tragic history. Between 2 1 and 26 February, its
pilots claimed ten enemy planes shot down, but the unit at the same
time had lost Lts. George W. Hynes, Wallace J. Hoskyn, and Gerald
McCallum. On 26 February it had only thirteen P-~o’Sin reasonable
readiness to fight an enemy who, as he closed in on Java, counted his
planes by the hundreds.” The American bombers knocked out a
number of grounded aircraft a t the Denpasar airfield on 2 2 February,
“definitely sank” two transports at Makassar two days later, and on
the 28th claimed the sinking of one transport and probably another
off the northern coast of Java. But under conditions of increasing
insecurity on the ground between missions, which added to the wear
and tear on both men and machines, the bomber command sent out a
total of eleven missions, or thirty-one sorties, between 2 1 and 2 8
February which could only be recorded as failures.100
The last missions were flown against Japanese forces gathering for
the invasion of Java. By 2 7 February a large enemy convoy had come
down from Jolo through Makassar Strait to join the main elements
of the enemy’s Third Fleet, while a second amphibious force moved
into position off Batavia in the west. Reports reaching the bomber
command were confusing and incomplete; one transport claimed by a
flight of three A-24’s seems to have been the extent of the damage
* See below, pp. 398-99.
397

About this file

Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.