“Nevers”44 pages
- p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to
“sweep the Germans from the sky…
- p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with
the ambitious idens of air power which…
- p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was
never equipped during…
- p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are
you in the Army or the Corps…
- p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard
anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
- p. 69 …But one axiom,
with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
- p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be
completely stopped, but their effects could best…
- p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never-
theless left an open question as to how…
- p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300
aircraft a month. The pattern of…
- p. 122 …the German Air Force, the
Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in
the…
- p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French
factories, the force had never been employed in a…
- p. 140 …into
a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands
of our own forces…
- p. 150 …Long-term needs
of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities
never…
- p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had
never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
- p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown
heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
- p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never-
theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
- p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other
bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
- p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points
have never been satisfactorily explained.
T h e general pattern…
- p. 277 …motors, sole-
noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit-
less search…
- p. 288 …planners and
from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate.
The translation of the accepted grand…
- p. 303 …the principal features of the plan
were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
- p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was
never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
- p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never
able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
- p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never
returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
- p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining
pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
- p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from
Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
- p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never
before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
- p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been
accomplished, yet now it…
- p. 509 …Island, in the
Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May
the two…
- p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the
aircrews, for on the operational level…
- p. 524 …handicaps under which
AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
- p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that
proper observance of economy of force would never…
- p. 531 …Crews which had
previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these
weapons into…
- p. 544 …But the Japanese never at
any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
- p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into
All told, the record…
- p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com-
mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
- p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the
CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
- p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force
never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
- p. 614 …that reason deserving a high
priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
- p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign-
ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
- p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never
below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
- p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England,
nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
- p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never
before equaled by the military forces of two…
- p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several
had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
mantle on 2 2 February, however, three of them, carrying most of the
Army personnel, ten P-~o’s,and many motor vehicles, had been
directed to Burma rather than to Java in keeping with a decision
which had been reached by 17 F e b r ~ a r y . ’ ~The decision had been
dictated by considerations which apparently also brought into ques-
tion the destination of the Langley, with its deckload of thirty-two
fully assembled P-~o’s,and of another vessel, the Sea Witch,in whose
hold twenty-seven crated P-40’s had been stored. But on the day of
its sailing General Wave11 ordered the Langley to Java, and a similar
order was subsequently issued for the Sea Witch; for shortly after
sailing, the Langley and, sometime later, the Sea Witch parted com-
pany with the other ships to set a course for Tjilatjap on southern
Java.98 The Sea Witch got through five days later, but the Langley
went down on 2 7 February-and none of the P-40’s they carried sur-
vived to fight the Japanese.”
Meanwhile, the I 7th Pursuit Squadron (Prov.) approached the
end of its brief and tragic history. Between 2 1 and 26 February, its
pilots claimed ten enemy planes shot down, but the unit at the same
time had lost Lts. George W. Hynes, Wallace J. Hoskyn, and Gerald
McCallum. On 26 February it had only thirteen P-~o’Sin reasonable
readiness to fight an enemy who, as he closed in on Java, counted his
planes by the hundreds.” The American bombers knocked out a
number of grounded aircraft a t the Denpasar airfield on 2 2 February,
“definitely sank” two transports at Makassar two days later, and on
the 28th claimed the sinking of one transport and probably another
off the northern coast of Java. But under conditions of increasing
insecurity on the ground between missions, which added to the wear
and tear on both men and machines, the bomber command sent out a
total of eleven missions, or thirty-one sorties, between 2 1 and 2 8
February which could only be recorded as failures.100
The last missions were flown against Japanese forces gathering for
the invasion of Java. By 2 7 February a large enemy convoy had come
down from Jolo through Makassar Strait to join the main elements
of the enemy’s Third Fleet, while a second amphibious force moved
into position off Batavia in the west. Reports reaching the bomber
command were confusing and incomplete; one transport claimed by a
flight of three A-24’s seems to have been the extent of the damage
* See below, pp. 398-99.
397