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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
severely damaged. T w o days later, one LB-30 was burned on the
ground at Jogjakarta and four B - I ~ D ’ sat Pasirian, a dispersal point
some thirty miles south of Soerabaja. O n 24 February, in a severe
attack on the depot at Bandoeng, three more B-17’s were destroyed.86
It was still possible for heavy bomber reinforcements to reach Java,
but unless something could be done to strengthen local air defenses,
obviously there was little point in further attempts to build up the
bomber command.
Indeed, it had been apparent to the Allied command since the fall
of Singapore that, barring some unexpected development, the Indies
were lost, and by this date the evacuation of Java was already under
way. T o local commanders the best opportunity to continue the
fight against the Japanese seemed to lie in Burma, where pilots of the
already famous A V G had joined the R A F in resisting the enemy’s
push toward Rangoon, an advance which carried the threat of cutting
off China from all outside aid. With Australian pickets above New
Guinea already driven in, and with the sea and air routes to the Philip-
pines effectively closed except to an occasional blockade-runner, sub-
marine, or long-range bomber flight, an effort to hold open a line of
communications with China appeared to offer the only hope of bring-
ing Allied offensive power to bear on the inner defenses of Japan’s
now swollen empire at a relatively early date. O n 18 February, Gen-
eral Brett advised the War Department that from his point of view
the one chance of overcoming the odds against the Allies was to
launch an offensive through Burma and China. At the same time, he
advised that we should build up strength in Au~tralia.’~Already he
had sent Colonel Brady to Burma, and upon receiving his report,
Brett determined to “send the mass of all troops” and 160 pursuit
planes to India.8s Thinking in terms of the establishment of an Amer-
ican command there, on his own initiative he directed Brereton to
proceed to India and made tentative plans to follow after a brief
return to Au~tralia.’~Accordingly, in the early morning of 2 3 Feb-
ruary, General Brett flew to Melbourne, and on the following day
Brereron and a small staff of officers left Java in two heavy bombers
for India.”
O n 2 3 February, General Wave11 also received orders to leave Java.
Three days earlier the Combined Chiefs in Washington had favored
a last-ditch defense with all forces then on the island and advised that
there should be no withdrawal of the forces of any nationality but,
395

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.