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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
severely damaged. T w o days later, one LB-30 was burned on the
ground at Jogjakarta and four B - I ~ D ’ sat Pasirian, a dispersal point
some thirty miles south of Soerabaja. O n 24 February, in a severe
attack on the depot at Bandoeng, three more B-17’s were destroyed.86
It was still possible for heavy bomber reinforcements to reach Java,
but unless something could be done to strengthen local air defenses,
obviously there was little point in further attempts to build up the
bomber command.
Indeed, it had been apparent to the Allied command since the fall
of Singapore that, barring some unexpected development, the Indies
were lost, and by this date the evacuation of Java was already under
way. T o local commanders the best opportunity to continue the
fight against the Japanese seemed to lie in Burma, where pilots of the
already famous A V G had joined the R A F in resisting the enemy’s
push toward Rangoon, an advance which carried the threat of cutting
off China from all outside aid. With Australian pickets above New
Guinea already driven in, and with the sea and air routes to the Philip-
pines effectively closed except to an occasional blockade-runner, sub-
marine, or long-range bomber flight, an effort to hold open a line of
communications with China appeared to offer the only hope of bring-
ing Allied offensive power to bear on the inner defenses of Japan’s
now swollen empire at a relatively early date. O n 18 February, Gen-
eral Brett advised the War Department that from his point of view
the one chance of overcoming the odds against the Allies was to
launch an offensive through Burma and China. At the same time, he
advised that we should build up strength in Au~tralia.’~Already he
had sent Colonel Brady to Burma, and upon receiving his report,
Brett determined to “send the mass of all troops” and 160 pursuit
planes to India.8s Thinking in terms of the establishment of an Amer-
ican command there, on his own initiative he directed Brereton to
proceed to India and made tentative plans to follow after a brief
return to Au~tralia.’~Accordingly, in the early morning of 2 3 Feb-
ruary, General Brett flew to Melbourne, and on the following day
Brereron and a small staff of officers left Java in two heavy bombers
for India.”
O n 2 3 February, General Wave11 also received orders to leave Java.
Three days earlier the Combined Chiefs in Washington had favored
a last-ditch defense with all forces then on the island and advised that
there should be no withdrawal of the forces of any nationality but,
395

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