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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
as ill informed of the combat as of the materiel phase of aeronautics,
and it was necessary to learn from the Allies all but the very rudiments
of flying. By Armistice Day the basic lessons had been absorbed, and
the Air Service, AEF, had shown some evidence of boldness of con-
cept in the application of air power; here, as in production, there was
great promise if only limited achievement. It is no reflection upon the
bravery and skill of American pilots to suggest that both achievement
and promise owed much to the genius of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell,
who was in a very real sense the founder of American air power.32
Mitchell, after a varied career in the Signal Corps, had become
interested in military aeronautics in its infancy and had followed its
progress in the European war through such information as was avail-
able in Washington. He had learned to fly in 1916and, as a major, had
for a while been in charge of the Signal Corps’ tiny Aviation Section.
Sent to Spain as a military observer in March 1917,he had moved up
to Paris with the American declaration of war. With characteristic
energy and disregard of military protocol, he had plunged immedi-
ately into the task of learning a t first hand the true nature of the air
war. Until Pershing’s arrival he was something of a free lance, and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the front lines. Sentiments which were later to stud his
public utterances began to appear in his diary: “The only real defense
against aircraft is other aircraft.” “A very significant thing to me was
that we could cross the lines of these contending armies in a few
minutes in our airplane, whereas the armies have been locked in the
struggle, immovable, powerless to advance for three years. , . .They
get nowhere, as far as ending the war is concerned.” After experienc-
ing a night raid by German planes, he had come to have a wholesome
respect for the material and morale effects of bombardment: “NOone
can ever tell me that there is nothing in airplane bombing. It will have
a great effect on all the operations, if efficiently carried out.” “Several
generations will have to be born and pass away before people can
adopt and maintain the same attitude toward this form of warfare as
they exhibit toward the old familiar ones.” ’’
In May, Mitchell visited Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced ideas of air power. Mitchell quoted approvingly Tren-
chard’s dictum that “an airplane is an offensive and not a defensive
weapon” and the views the latter expressed on behind-the-line bom-
I 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.