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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 14 …with the commanding general, who in some instances moved in advance of promptings from Wash- ington…
  • p. 25 …EASTERNAND WESTERNAPPROACHESTO PANAMACANAL ALASKAAND THE ALEUTIANISLANDS PRINCIPALSEAAND AIR ROUTESAS DESIGNATEDBY WASH- ATLANTICFERRYINGAND TRANSPORTROUTESPRIORTO . . . . . . . . . . 297 30' 305…
  • p. 229 …the importance of the Far East Air Force in American strategy, the Air Staff in Wash…
  • p. 292 …Even so, there was in Wash- ington too little intelligence concerning the fluid tactical situation to…
  • p. 302 …The suggestion had been carried out in 1941 with the establishment of the U.S. Special…
  • p. 306 …work permanently with the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Wash- ington. The Combined Military Transportation Committee…
  • p. 389 …to delay the take-off was granted only after an appeal to Wash- ington.’O 3…
  • p. 442 …the time and attention of U.S. officers at Brisbane and of headquarters in Wash- ington…
  • p. 443 …Accidents delayed three planes en route, and one of the P-40’s was completely “washed…
  • p. 454 …promise of weakening the enemy. Attention already had been given in Wash- ington to establishment of…
  • p. 554 …In China, he found the procurement of necessary equipment, even be- fore the outbreak of war…
  • p. 636 …After further negotiations in Wash- ington, the Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement was adopted on z I…
  • p. 693 …Accordingly, Wash- ington was requested to send immediately 50 intelligence officers for training by the RAF…
  • p. 747 …before the Committee on Military Af- fairs, House of Representatives (Wash- 23. See, for instance, William…
  • p. 772 …The exact date of the arrival of air units is not known, as the latter source…
  • p. 799 …The road from Haiphong, Indo- China, to Yunnan was closed by the Vichy government in 1940…
  • p. 814 …Overseas (Ferrying), Air Min- istry, Memorandum on the Movement by Air of US. Forces to the…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
as ill informed of the combat as of the materiel phase of aeronautics,
and it was necessary to learn from the Allies all but the very rudiments
of flying. By Armistice Day the basic lessons had been absorbed, and
the Air Service, AEF, had shown some evidence of boldness of con-
cept in the application of air power; here, as in production, there was
great promise if only limited achievement. It is no reflection upon the
bravery and skill of American pilots to suggest that both achievement
and promise owed much to the genius of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell,
who was in a very real sense the founder of American air power.32
Mitchell, after a varied career in the Signal Corps, had become
interested in military aeronautics in its infancy and had followed its
progress in the European war through such information as was avail-
able in Washington. He had learned to fly in 1916and, as a major, had
for a while been in charge of the Signal Corps’ tiny Aviation Section.
Sent to Spain as a military observer in March 1917,he had moved up
to Paris with the American declaration of war. With characteristic
energy and disregard of military protocol, he had plunged immedi-
ately into the task of learning a t first hand the true nature of the air
war. Until Pershing’s arrival he was something of a free lance, and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the front lines. Sentiments which were later to stud his
public utterances began to appear in his diary: “The only real defense
against aircraft is other aircraft.” “A very significant thing to me was
that we could cross the lines of these contending armies in a few
minutes in our airplane, whereas the armies have been locked in the
struggle, immovable, powerless to advance for three years. , . .They
get nowhere, as far as ending the war is concerned.” After experienc-
ing a night raid by German planes, he had come to have a wholesome
respect for the material and morale effects of bombardment: “NOone
can ever tell me that there is nothing in airplane bombing. It will have
a great effect on all the operations, if efficiently carried out.” “Several
generations will have to be born and pass away before people can
adopt and maintain the same attitude toward this form of warfare as
they exhibit toward the old familiar ones.” ’’
In May, Mitchell visited Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced ideas of air power. Mitchell quoted approvingly Tren-
chard’s dictum that “an airplane is an offensive and not a defensive
weapon” and the views the latter expressed on behind-the-line bom-
I 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.