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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 125 …an invading army. For that job they were well equipped, trained, and organized. Though the Luftwaff…
  • p. 127 …For the first time, German parachute troops were successfully employed when the Nazi forces invaded Holland…
  • p. 131 …equipment for moving an invading force across the intervening waters. The army itself, caught unprepared, required…
  • p. 134 …By the first of June the British had been forced to yield Crete to the invaders…
  • p. 183 …Nevertheless, a land army should be prepared to invade the continent and Germany itself. T h…
  • p. 246 …this effort." Apparently the course of the invaders plotted earlier in the morning was not utilized…
  • p. 263 …tanks, but they too “strafed and restrafed the invaders.” As Lt. Samuel H. Marrett, squadron commander…
  • p. 461 …the invading forces was merely preliminary to the bringing in of bombers in preparation for the…
  • p. 493 …Its nickel and chrome mines were readily accessible to an invader. Admiral King believed that the…
  • p. 522 …after the action; not until the war ended and the teams of interrogators invaded Japan was…
  • p. 529 …There was no intention of invading the Alaskan mainland, or even Dutch Harbor; the objective was…
  • p. 535 …Four of the most efficient carriers had gone down, carrying with them the hopes of Admiral…
  • p. 559 …the latter presented the more immediate need for reinforcement. Tavoy had fallen to Japanese invaders as…
  • p. 630 …The Netherlands East Indies and Burma, already invaded, were doomed. T h e Indian Ocean was…
  • p. 633 …to the preliminary strategic bombardment and only modestly to direct support of the invading force. A…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
as ill informed of the combat as of the materiel phase of aeronautics,
and it was necessary to learn from the Allies all but the very rudiments
of flying. By Armistice Day the basic lessons had been absorbed, and
the Air Service, AEF, had shown some evidence of boldness of con-
cept in the application of air power; here, as in production, there was
great promise if only limited achievement. It is no reflection upon the
bravery and skill of American pilots to suggest that both achievement
and promise owed much to the genius of Brig. Gen. William Mitchell,
who was in a very real sense the founder of American air power.32
Mitchell, after a varied career in the Signal Corps, had become
interested in military aeronautics in its infancy and had followed its
progress in the European war through such information as was avail-
able in Washington. He had learned to fly in 1916and, as a major, had
for a while been in charge of the Signal Corps’ tiny Aviation Section.
Sent to Spain as a military observer in March 1917,he had moved up
to Paris with the American declaration of war. With characteristic
energy and disregard of military protocol, he had plunged immedi-
ately into the task of learning a t first hand the true nature of the air
war. Until Pershing’s arrival he was something of a free lance, and his
inspections took him to various headquarters, to depots and airfields,
to-and over-the front lines. Sentiments which were later to stud his
public utterances began to appear in his diary: “The only real defense
against aircraft is other aircraft.” “A very significant thing to me was
that we could cross the lines of these contending armies in a few
minutes in our airplane, whereas the armies have been locked in the
struggle, immovable, powerless to advance for three years. , . .They
get nowhere, as far as ending the war is concerned.” After experienc-
ing a night raid by German planes, he had come to have a wholesome
respect for the material and morale effects of bombardment: “NOone
can ever tell me that there is nothing in airplane bombing. It will have
a great effect on all the operations, if efficiently carried out.” “Several
generations will have to be born and pass away before people can
adopt and maintain the same attitude toward this form of warfare as
they exhibit toward the old familiar ones.” ’’
In May, Mitchell visited Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, then com-
mander of the Royal Flying Corps, and was profoundly impressed by
his advanced ideas of air power. Mitchell quoted approvingly Tren-
chard’s dictum that “an airplane is an offensive and not a defensive
weapon” and the views the latter expressed on behind-the-line bom-
I 2

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.