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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
with a four-inch layer of soil to provide a usable though sometimes
boggy runway. Local Dutch residents opened their homes to the
Americans, who had not enjoyed such “good baths, good food, good
whiskey, good beds” since leaving the United States. But there were
only two mechanics available for upkeep of the planes, and for four
days the crews worked from dawn to late a t night getting their planes
into shape. For parts, they cannibalized one of the aircraft, and they
lost still another when it came down in Soerabaja Bay. Then after a
week of preparation a t Mod jokerto, the remaining seven planes flew
to Malang to secure adjustment of shackles and adapters for use of the
Dutch There on the fateful 19th of February they were
ready for operations.
T h e honor of carrying out the initial low-level bombing attack had
already gone to the pursuit planes of the 17th Squadron. T w o days
earlier, on 17 February, eight of the P-40’s had flown seventy-five
miles to Madioen to pick up a bomb load of four zo-kilogram bombs
per plane. Another hop, this time of 3 2 5 miles, brought them to
Batavia, whence they flew 275 miles across the Java Sea for a bombing
and strafing attack on Japanese shipping and aircraft in the region of
recently captured Palembang. Though the weather favored the attack,
Japanese fighters intercepted so spiritedly that only three of the
American planes were successful in breaking through to the targets.
Bombs were dropped among enemy landing barges, and the Americans
accounted for four of the Japanese fighters with no loss to themselves.
All of the P-40’s returned safely to Ngoro the next day.’2
That was the day the Japanese landed on Bali in an action that
would effectively cut the ferry route from Australia. T h e prospect of
this interference with plans for reinforcement of Java naturally had
been a source of great concern to Allied commanders, and as early as
I 7 January, General Wave11 had decided to attempt a reinforcement
of Timor. By 4 February arrangements had been completed for
strengthening the defenses of this key point along the way by sending
from Australia an antiaircraft battery, most of an American field ar-
tillery regiment, and an additional infantry battali~n.’~But the prob-
lem of protecting from air attack the ships on which they were to be
transported and other factors delayed their deparrure from Darwin
until 1 5 February, when four transports escorted by the US. cruiser
Houston and the destroyer Peary-Wave11 and Brett had hoped to
provide air cover-sailed for T i m ~ r . ~ ~Unhappily, the convoy was
39’

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