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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 43 …cavalry mounted on gas driven flying horses” never arrived to “sweep the Germans from the sky…
  • p. 46 …Mitchell never received an American air force commensurate with the ambitious idens of air power which…
  • p. 49 …This project, like so many others, had lagged, and the Air Service was never equipped during…
  • p. 50 …the Army or the Air Corps?” but never, “Are you in the Army or the Corps…
  • p. 55 …any Air Service officers, and I have never heard anybody yet-any Air Service officer-against…
  • p. 69 …But one axiom, with its corollaries, never varied. T o him the airplane was first and…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 94 …rate for the time being, the decision never- theless left an open question as to how…
  • p. 121 …large-scale warfare; production of combat types never exceeded 300 aircraft a month. The pattern of…
  • p. 122 …the German Air Force, the Regia Aeronautica never exhibited sufficient power to be decisive in the…
  • p. 133 …Except for a few raids against French factories, the force had never been employed in a…
  • p. 140 …into a complete war economy production was never equal to the demands of our own forces…
  • p. 150 …Long-term needs of the Air Corps and the sudden availability of funds in quantities never…
  • p. 181 …Actually, the Air Staff had never approved of the method followed in RAINBOW No. 5 . l…
  • p. 217 …Members of the Hawaiian Air Force, who had never flown heavy bombers, began to receive intensive…
  • p. 219 …were not then satisfactory for permanent garrisons. Never- theless, the commander of the Hawaiian Department, Lt…
  • p. 227 …T h e planes never reached their destination. Other bombardment units were being prepared for transfer…
  • p. 241 …responsible officers, a few crucial points have never been satisfactorily explained. T h e general pattern…
  • p. 277 …motors, sole- noids, and gun mounts-were never found. After many hours of fruit- less search…
  • p. 288 …planners and from which AAF Headquarters was never to deviate. The translation of the accepted grand…
  • p. 303 …the principal features of the plan were never challenged, it was subsequently revised in a draft…
  • p. 309 …W a r Plans Division was never incorporated into GHQ and remained a potential rival to…
  • p. 336 …the shooting and wrote that they were never able to make out an airplane.g6It is…
  • p. 412 …As it happened, the B-24's never returned to India, but, instead, remained in the…
  • p. 457 …Meanwhile the Edsall with the remaining pilots had headed for Java, never to be heard from…
  • p. 492 …Squadron was assigned, but which it would never reach, going from Australia to Tongatabu; ( 3 ) Christmas…
  • p. 500 …deck of a carrier presented a problem never before challenged by Army planes. Hence an accelerated…
  • p. 502 …the bows and wetting the flight deck. Never before had this been accomplished, yet now it…
  • p. 509 …Island, in the Louisiade Archipelago.” They were never needed, for on 7-8 May the two…
  • p. 513 …exist, it was at a point which never reached the aircrews, for on the operational level…
  • p. 524 …handicaps under which AAF planes had operated. Never were more than fourteen B- I 7’s…
  • p. 527 …AAF planners clung firmly to their belief that proper observance of economy of force would never…
  • p. 531 …Crews which had previously never loaded torpedoes now for the first time fitted these weapons into…
  • p. 544 …But the Japanese never at any time based their bombers in appreciable numbers a t either…
  • p. 548 …26's in torpedo-dropping, but they never would be put into All told, the record…
  • p. 556 …until it had been thoroughly trained and never to com- mit it piecemeal. General Magruder had…
  • p. 560 …pressed into service against the Germans," and never reached the CBI." Colonel Haynes had reached India…
  • p. 606 …reason that the Antilles Air Task Force never evolved, as did I Bomber Command, into an…
  • p. 614 …that reason deserving a high priority, could never dispose of the U-boat menace but must…
  • p. 635 …In Washington the Munitions Assign- ments Board t had never considered this schedule as more than…
  • p. 670 …they bombed from 39,200 feet, and never below 30,000. By AAF standards they had…
  • p. 672 …Goering had never put enough bombers over England, nor had he concentrated his forces on the…
  • p. 690 …of co-operation and combined action probably never before equaled by the military forces of two…
  • p. 729 …shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
with a four-inch layer of soil to provide a usable though sometimes
boggy runway. Local Dutch residents opened their homes to the
Americans, who had not enjoyed such “good baths, good food, good
whiskey, good beds” since leaving the United States. But there were
only two mechanics available for upkeep of the planes, and for four
days the crews worked from dawn to late a t night getting their planes
into shape. For parts, they cannibalized one of the aircraft, and they
lost still another when it came down in Soerabaja Bay. Then after a
week of preparation a t Mod jokerto, the remaining seven planes flew
to Malang to secure adjustment of shackles and adapters for use of the
Dutch There on the fateful 19th of February they were
ready for operations.
T h e honor of carrying out the initial low-level bombing attack had
already gone to the pursuit planes of the 17th Squadron. T w o days
earlier, on 17 February, eight of the P-40’s had flown seventy-five
miles to Madioen to pick up a bomb load of four zo-kilogram bombs
per plane. Another hop, this time of 3 2 5 miles, brought them to
Batavia, whence they flew 275 miles across the Java Sea for a bombing
and strafing attack on Japanese shipping and aircraft in the region of
recently captured Palembang. Though the weather favored the attack,
Japanese fighters intercepted so spiritedly that only three of the
American planes were successful in breaking through to the targets.
Bombs were dropped among enemy landing barges, and the Americans
accounted for four of the Japanese fighters with no loss to themselves.
All of the P-40’s returned safely to Ngoro the next day.’2
That was the day the Japanese landed on Bali in an action that
would effectively cut the ferry route from Australia. T h e prospect of
this interference with plans for reinforcement of Java naturally had
been a source of great concern to Allied commanders, and as early as
I 7 January, General Wave11 had decided to attempt a reinforcement
of Timor. By 4 February arrangements had been completed for
strengthening the defenses of this key point along the way by sending
from Australia an antiaircraft battery, most of an American field ar-
tillery regiment, and an additional infantry battali~n.’~But the prob-
lem of protecting from air attack the ships on which they were to be
transported and other factors delayed their deparrure from Darwin
until 1 5 February, when four transports escorted by the US. cruiser
Houston and the destroyer Peary-Wave11 and Brett had hoped to
provide air cover-sailed for T i m ~ r . ~ ~Unhappily, the convoy was
39’

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