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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
L O S S O F N E T H E R L A N D S E A S T I N D I E S
with a four-inch layer of soil to provide a usable though sometimes
boggy runway. Local Dutch residents opened their homes to the
Americans, who had not enjoyed such “good baths, good food, good
whiskey, good beds” since leaving the United States. But there were
only two mechanics available for upkeep of the planes, and for four
days the crews worked from dawn to late a t night getting their planes
into shape. For parts, they cannibalized one of the aircraft, and they
lost still another when it came down in Soerabaja Bay. Then after a
week of preparation a t Mod jokerto, the remaining seven planes flew
to Malang to secure adjustment of shackles and adapters for use of the
Dutch There on the fateful 19th of February they were
ready for operations.
T h e honor of carrying out the initial low-level bombing attack had
already gone to the pursuit planes of the 17th Squadron. T w o days
earlier, on 17 February, eight of the P-40’s had flown seventy-five
miles to Madioen to pick up a bomb load of four zo-kilogram bombs
per plane. Another hop, this time of 3 2 5 miles, brought them to
Batavia, whence they flew 275 miles across the Java Sea for a bombing
and strafing attack on Japanese shipping and aircraft in the region of
recently captured Palembang. Though the weather favored the attack,
Japanese fighters intercepted so spiritedly that only three of the
American planes were successful in breaking through to the targets.
Bombs were dropped among enemy landing barges, and the Americans
accounted for four of the Japanese fighters with no loss to themselves.
All of the P-40’s returned safely to Ngoro the next day.’2
That was the day the Japanese landed on Bali in an action that
would effectively cut the ferry route from Australia. T h e prospect of
this interference with plans for reinforcement of Java naturally had
been a source of great concern to Allied commanders, and as early as
I 7 January, General Wave11 had decided to attempt a reinforcement
of Timor. By 4 February arrangements had been completed for
strengthening the defenses of this key point along the way by sending
from Australia an antiaircraft battery, most of an American field ar-
tillery regiment, and an additional infantry battali~n.’~But the prob-
lem of protecting from air attack the ships on which they were to be
transported and other factors delayed their deparrure from Darwin
until 1 5 February, when four transports escorted by the US. cruiser
Houston and the destroyer Peary-Wave11 and Brett had hoped to
provide air cover-sailed for T i m ~ r . ~ ~Unhappily, the convoy was
39’

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Document, cited by the archive. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 863 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.