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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
from below on vulnerable bomb bay tanks.fi8Such lessons of experi-
ence would prove of great value to the AAF in later days of the war,
but there was little comfort for those who provided the experience.
T h e weather continued bad, the fields were muddy, and mechanics
worked for twenty-four hours at a time to keep the big planes in re-
pair. From 9 February to the I 8th, not counting reconnaissance, ferry,
or courier flights, the bombers attempted a total of sixteen missions
involving seventy-two B-17 and fifteen LB-30 sorties. O n fifty-one of
these sorties, the planes turned back, a few of them for mechanical
reasons but most of them because of impenetrable weather. Of those
which got through to the target areas, only a few could claim success.
All too typical was the report of a flight of three bombers on 1 2 Feb-
ruary that they “believed they hit a boat.” Perhaps the best day came
on I 5 February, when five B- I 7’s claimed one hit on an auxiliary vessel
and another on a cruiser. T h e following day claims also were made for
hits on two transport^.^' T h e weather was bad for the Japanese, too,
but the enemy had the advantage of numbers and somehow the
weather seemed to break clear over his targets more frequently than
over those selected by the Americans. Lacking any advantage of
numbers or of fighter escort, the bombers usually made their runs at
high altitude, as standard procedure directed. T h e inadequate air de-
fenses of the fields in Java frequently made it necessary between
missions and during daylight hours to put the bombers into the air to
prevent their destruction on the ground, a necessity which added
greatly to the mounting strain on all personnel.
For low-level attack on the lucrative targets provided by the Japa-
nese as they closed in on Java, the A-24’~of the 27th Bombardment
Group (L) had started a movement up from Australia on 9 February
when three of the dive bombers took off in company with a flight of
the 3d Pursuit Squadron. As already recorded, only one of these three,
that flown by Capt. Edward N. Backus who commanded the 91st
Squadron, reached Java, but eleven others headed out over the Timor
Sea from Darwin on I I February in what was destined to be the last
ferry flight by short-range planes from Australia to Java. T h e flight,
having lost one plane by crack-up at Waingapoe on Soemba, arrived
late in the afternoon of 1 2 February at Modjokerto in Java where,
approximately I O O miles west of Malang, a new airfield was under con-
s t r u ~ t i o n . ~ ~On land formerly given over to rice fields, some 1,200
natives had laid a base of bamboo matting which then was covered
390

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