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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 173 …At the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at sea in mid-August, Generals Marshall and Arnold had made…
  • p. 226 …Air Service Command under Col. L.S. Churchill. Because of a shortage of experienced officers, only…
  • p. 282 …President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with their chiefs of staff, then meeting in Washington, had…
  • p. 287 …the arrival in Washington of Prime Minister Churchill, his chiefs of staff, and other high-ranking…
  • p. 290 …stipulated in ABC-I. A t Mr. Churchill’s request, U.S. troops were to relieve…
  • p. 302 …the U.S. forces, and by Mr. Churchill as British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense…
  • p. 303 …Field Marshal Sir John Dill representing Mr. Churchill as Minister of De- fense. Sir John Dill…
  • p. 304 …of such a personal representative of Mr. Churchill might make difficult the maintenance of normal military…
  • p. 425 …O n the same day, Prime Minister Churchill informed Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of his selection…
  • p. 628 …Western Hemisphere. When the President and Mr. Churchill met with their military staffs in the ARCADIA…
  • p. 630 …strong support in a long cable from Churchill to Roosevelt, delivered on 5 March, in which…
  • p. 636 …first in a gen- eral meeting with Churchill, later among the airmen alone.34Arnold reviewed the…
  • p. 639 …Much had happened in the two months which had passed since Churchill had approved that plan…
  • p. 640 …Duncan, chief of staff for the Eighth Air Force, wrote from Washington to Spaatz that Churchill…
  • p. 641 …postponement was al- most tantamount to refusal. Churchill was back in London by the 27th. In…
  • p. 642 …then back in Washington, that Roosevelt and Churchill “believed” that T O R C H was…
  • p. 661 …Even during the Battle of Britain, Churchill could tell the House of Commons that “there seems…
  • p. 705 …4 1 . ~ ~The following month, Prime Minister Churchill in conference with Messrs. Harry Hopkins and Averell…
  • p. 810 …2 0 August 1940, in R.S. Churchill, ed., Into Battle (London, 1941),p. 2 5…
  • p. 811 …comp., Winston Churchill’s Secret Session Speeches (New York, 1946), p. 85. 161. Larner report, as…
  • p. 845 …L.S., 182 Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 133, 1369 141, 232, 235-37, 2409 2431 252…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
from below on vulnerable bomb bay tanks.fi8Such lessons of experi-
ence would prove of great value to the AAF in later days of the war,
but there was little comfort for those who provided the experience.
T h e weather continued bad, the fields were muddy, and mechanics
worked for twenty-four hours at a time to keep the big planes in re-
pair. From 9 February to the I 8th, not counting reconnaissance, ferry,
or courier flights, the bombers attempted a total of sixteen missions
involving seventy-two B-17 and fifteen LB-30 sorties. O n fifty-one of
these sorties, the planes turned back, a few of them for mechanical
reasons but most of them because of impenetrable weather. Of those
which got through to the target areas, only a few could claim success.
All too typical was the report of a flight of three bombers on 1 2 Feb-
ruary that they “believed they hit a boat.” Perhaps the best day came
on I 5 February, when five B- I 7’s claimed one hit on an auxiliary vessel
and another on a cruiser. T h e following day claims also were made for
hits on two transport^.^' T h e weather was bad for the Japanese, too,
but the enemy had the advantage of numbers and somehow the
weather seemed to break clear over his targets more frequently than
over those selected by the Americans. Lacking any advantage of
numbers or of fighter escort, the bombers usually made their runs at
high altitude, as standard procedure directed. T h e inadequate air de-
fenses of the fields in Java frequently made it necessary between
missions and during daylight hours to put the bombers into the air to
prevent their destruction on the ground, a necessity which added
greatly to the mounting strain on all personnel.
For low-level attack on the lucrative targets provided by the Japa-
nese as they closed in on Java, the A-24’~of the 27th Bombardment
Group (L) had started a movement up from Australia on 9 February
when three of the dive bombers took off in company with a flight of
the 3d Pursuit Squadron. As already recorded, only one of these three,
that flown by Capt. Edward N. Backus who commanded the 91st
Squadron, reached Java, but eleven others headed out over the Timor
Sea from Darwin on I I February in what was destined to be the last
ferry flight by short-range planes from Australia to Java. T h e flight,
having lost one plane by crack-up at Waingapoe on Soemba, arrived
late in the afternoon of 1 2 February at Modjokerto in Java where,
approximately I O O miles west of Malang, a new airfield was under con-
s t r u ~ t i o n . ~ ~On land formerly given over to rice fields, some 1,200
natives had laid a base of bamboo matting which then was covered
390

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