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The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 1 (archived PDF)

Air Force Historical Studies Office · 863 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume One of The Army Air Forces in World War II, titled Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. The University of Chicago Press first published it in 1948, and the Office of Air Force History reprinted it in 1983. The front matter explains how the AAF historical program was set up during the war. The index covers Pacific, Atlantic and European operations, and nothing in the text concerns unidentified aerial phenomena.

  • p. 2 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOPRESS, CHICAGO8 LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada Copyright 1948 by…
  • p. 48 …An Associated Press dispatch of 10 October gave a contemporary judgment of the importance of this…
  • p. 55 …Air Service (Corps) found it difficult to press vigorously for reorgani- zation and, by default, leadership…
  • p. 56 …In 1919the W a r Department was pressing for a drastic revision of the military establishment…
  • p. 61 …It held that there was no danger of an air attack on the United States and…
  • p. 64 …GHQ Air Forcq a trial than to press for more radical measures, and Howell’s group…
  • p. 75 …Powerful air attacks resolutely pressed home could never be completely stopped, but their effects could best…
  • p. 98 …based air operations in defense of the United States and its overseas posses~ions.’~T w…
  • p. 99 …General Westover’s report concluded that “all Air Force units could be concentrated on either coast…
  • p. 130 …the Admiralty began to press for control of naval air units, while the army attempted to…
  • p. 149 …basic and advanced Responsibility for crew and unit train- ing was vested in the GHQ Air…
  • p. 164 …A m y air units in the Territory existed primarily for the defense of this and…
  • p. 176 …no military alliances were made which would commit the United States to war; the plans only…
  • p. 278 …There were also grounds for hoping that heavy bomber units now based on Darwin might increase…
  • p. 285 …From 1938 the United States had invoked sanctions against Japan in the form of moral em…
  • p. 287 …Over-all Strategy and lmmediate Deployment On 2 2 December, the press announced dramatically the arrival…
  • p. 289 …ground units sent in that direction were not destined for immediate combat. No major invasion of…
  • p. 323 …Seizure of bases in Canada or Mexico for later attacks on the United States. Capture of…
  • p. 366 …United state^,^ and the British them- selves were forced to withdraw some pilots from combat units…
  • p. 380 …Upon the request of the Ferrying Command, the State Depart- ment again pressed for an answer…
  • p. 397 …the summer and fall, first as the United States Middle East Air Force and later as…
  • p. 430 …Attempts had been made to replace these obsolete craft by purchase from the United States, but…
  • p. 440 …But as the Japanese pressed forward the Americans were given no opportunity to get set. The…
  • p. 463 …personnel that would be reassigned to infantry units whose rosters already included many representatives of the…
  • p. 552 …pines and more recently of American air units operating in the Netherlands East Indies, he was…
  • p. 560 …Moreover, examination proved that most of the basic equipment of the units, including badly needed trucks…
  • p. 563 …Grady arrived from the United States for a comprehensive survey of Indian resources with reference to…
  • p. 564 …TO C H I N A graphic units, and unfavorable atmospheric conditions combined to make high…
  • p. 607 …Thus the AAF units engaged in the anti-U-boat war became almost a t once…
  • p. 628 …Army air bombardment units would operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against…
  • p. 658 …was to operate in the United Kingdom.14' All air units initially based there were to…
  • p. 683 …of the units of the infant Eighth until their departure for the United Kingdom several months…
  • p. 691 …The RAF proposed that American fighter units be integrated with its own under a plan eventually…
  • p. 748 …533.) By 1928he was (Patrick, United States in the Air, pp. 190-91.) 38. Charges of…
  • p. 770 …y.W D Press Release, 2 1 June 1941. 9 1 . AR 95-5, 3a. 92…
  • p. 857 …Presque Isle, 344, 347-49, 641, 644-45 Press comment: B-17, 662-63; danger of…
T H E A R M Y A I R F O R C E S I N W O R L D W A R I 1
planned deployment of American pursuit units could be completed
before late March, and every indication was that by then the fate of
Java already would have been sealed.
Japanese Encirclement of Java
On 1 5 February Singapore fell. Already the enemy held virtually
all areas of strategic importance in Borneo and Celebes. H e was slowly
but surely eliminating a courageous Australian garrison on Amboina,
where the Japanese had landed on 3 1 January. After an Allied naval
force of four cruisers and seven destroyers had been driven back in
Makassar Strait on 4 February, the enemy’s strength in the air had
restricted efforts by naval units of the ABDA Command almost en-
tirely to night operations. The invasion of Sumatra began on 14 Feb-
ruary with a paratroop drop at Palembang, where on the following
day a reinforced enemy controlled both the town and its airfield. The
enemy was closing in on Java, and there was little if any prospect of
wresting from him that air superiority which on all sides prepared the
way for his advance.
Indeed, General Brett already had suggested to the W a r Depart-
ment the necessity for prompt attention to the probability that only
through Burma and China and along a line extending northward from
Australia would the Allies be given an opportunity to strike back.
Fitting his actions to his words, he had sent Brady to Burma for a sur-
vey of facilities, supplies, and munitions, and had called on General
Barnes in Australia for pertinent study and report.66
Reinforcements for the bomber command continued to come in;
five B-I~E’sreached Java by way of the Atlantic route during the first
week of February and two LB-3o’s by the Pacific. In two LB-~o’s,
twenty more officers and men were evacuated from Mindanao, and
by submarine four officers reached Java from C~rregidor.’~But foul
weather and enemy interception thwarted all attempts to bomb targets
of importance for ten days after 2 February. T h e major effort was
made on the morning of 8 February, when Capt. J.L. Dufrane led out
nine B-17’~in an attempt to strike back at Kendari. The weather pro-
vided a cloud cover that appeared inviting but actually contained so
much turbulence as to make flying in formation almost impossible, and
about halfway across the Java Sea the Americans were set upon by
nine to twelve enemy fighters. In what the survivors agreed was the
best-executed attack yet encountered, the Japanese concentrated first
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